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I. INTRODUCTION 
On February 11, 1994, President Clinton promulgated Executive 
Order 12,8981 reqUlnng all federal agencies to promote 
environmental justice "[t]o the greatest extent practicable and 
permitted by law.,,2 However, Section (K)09 of the Order limits the 
ability of citizens to enforce its provisions by specifically stating that 
it is not intended to create a right of judicial review against the 
United States.3 Additionally, the presidential directive4 issued 
simultaneously with Executive Order 12,898 requires that federal 
agencies providing funding to programs affecting human health or 
the environment ensure that their grant recipients comply with the 
anti-discrimination provisions in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.5 However, the directive is not judicially enforceable and does 
not enlarge existing Title VI rights.6 
.Title VI contains two separate sections that provide different 
enforcement mechanisms. Under Section 601 of Title VI, private 
citizens may file a private law suit challenging the discriminatory 
actions of any recipient of federal funds.7 However, there is a high 
* Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. BA, 1983, Harvard University; J.D., 1987, 
Yale Law School. All errors or omissions are my responsibility. 
1. Executive Order 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995) reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994). See 
also, Bradford C. Mank, Executive Order 12898, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (Michael B. 
Gerrard ed., forthcoming 1999). 
2. Exec. Order 12,898, supra note 1, at §1-101. 
3. See id. at § 6-609; see also In re Chemical Waste Management of Indiana, Inc., No. IND 
078 911 146, RCRA Appeals Nos. 95-2 & 95-3, 1995 WL 395962 at *4 (EPA, Env. App. Bd. 
june 29, 1995) (holding that "the Executive Order does not purport to, and does not have 
the effect of, changing the substantive requirements for issuance of a permit under RCRA 
and its implementing regulations.");julie R. Domike & Arthur W. Ray, EPA, CouTts Focus on 
Title VI Issues in Locating Industrial Plants in Luw-Income Areas, Nat'l LJ., Dec. 1, 1997, at Cl; 
Major Willie A Gunn, From the LandJiU to the Other Side of the Tracks: Developing Empuwerment 
Strategies to Alleuiate Environmental Injustice, 22 OHIO N.U.L.REv. 1227, 1252 n.166, 1256, 1286 
n.424 (1996); Mank, supra note 1. 
4. See Memorandum on Environmental justice, 1 Pl,IB PAPERS 241, 242 (Feb. 11, 1994); 
Mank, supra note 1. 
5. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4(1994) (originally enacted as 
Pub. L. 88-352, Title VI, §§ 601-605, 78 Stat. 252-53 (1964»; Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing 
"Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U L. REv. 
787,834-39 (1993); Bradford C. Mank, EnvironmentalJustice and Discriminatory Siting: l&k-
Based Representation and Equitable Compensation, 56 OHIO ST. LJ. 329, 383-86 (1995) 
[hereinafter Mank, Environmental Justice]. 
6. The presidential directive accompanying the order states that it does not create any 
enforceable judicial rights. See Memorandum on Environmental justice, 1 PuB PAPERS at 
242, supra note 4; Mank, Executive Order 12898, supra note 1. 
7. "No Person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, 
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standard of proof under Section 601 of Title VI because a plaintiff 
must demonstrate that the recipient has consciously discriminated 
• •• 8 
agaInst mmonty groups. 
Alternatively, the Supreme Court has concluded that agencies 
may promulgate regulations, pursuant to Section 602 of Title VI, 
that prohibit practices creating unjustified discriminatory efIects.9 
Several federal agencies, including the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), have promulgated such regulations that prohibit 
recipients from engaging in practices that cause disparate 
impacts. 1o The EPA's regulations establish procedures to 
investigate citizen complaints alleging that a recipient has made 
decisions having discriminatory efIects. ll 
However, it is unclear whether these agency regulations, based 
on Section 602 of Title VI, create a private right of action allowing 
plaintiffs to sue in federal courts.12 In 1996, in Chester Residents 
Concerned for QJlality Living v. Seils the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania refused to recognize a private right 
of action under Title VI's Section 602 regulations. Subsequently, 
the Third Circuit reversed that decision and held that a private 
be excluded from paruapation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 
U.S.C. § 2000d at 528; see also infra notes SO, 65 and accompanying text. 
8. See generally Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism Claims Bwught Under Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act, 25 ENVIL. L. 285, 291-94 (1995) (suggesting discrimination in residential housing 
patterns or lack of political clout rather than conscious discrimination may account for 
environmental inequities harming racial minorities); Lazarus, supra note 5, at 825-26; see also 
Sheila Foster, Race(ial) Matters: The Qy,est for Environmental Justice, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721, 733-
35 (1993); infra notes 50, 65-66 and accompanying text. . 
9. Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal 
financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract 
other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to 
effectuate the provisions of section 2000d of this tide with respect to such program 
or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall 
be consistent with the achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the 
financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l; see also infra notes 55-74 and accompanying text. 
10. See Paul K. Sonn, Note, Fighting Minority Underrepresentation in Publicly Funded 
Construction Projects After Croson: A Title VI Litigation Strategy, 101 YALE LJ. 1577, 1581 n.25 
(1992) (listing Tide VI regulations for several federal agencies). 
11. See 40 C.F.R. § 7;James H. Colopy, Note, The Road Less Traveled: Pursuing Environmental 
Justice Through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN. ENVIL. LJ. 125, 128 (1994); 
infra notes 78-83 and accompanying text. 
12. See generally infra notes 192-293 and accompanying text. 
13. 944 F. Supp. 413 (E.D. Pa. 1996), rev'd 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997), vacated, No. 97-
1620,119 S. Ct. 22 (1998). 
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right of action may exist under these regulations. 14 The court 
utilized a three-factor test to determine the existence of a private 
right of action under Section 602: first, whether the agency rule is 
properly within the scope of the enabling statute; second, whether 
the enabling statute intended to create a private right of action; 
and third, whether the implication of a private right of action 
under the regulation will further the purpose of the enabling 
statute. IS The EPA's regulations clearly meet the first test. Also, 
there are strong arguments that a private right of action advances 
Title VI's purposes, thus satisfying the third factor. However, the 
Third Circuit's argument concerning the second factor, 
congressional intent, is open to criticism in light of recent 
Supreme Court decisions regarding the amount of evidence 
necessary to demonstrate intent to create a private right of action.16 
On June 8, 1998, the Supreme Court, in Seif v. Chester Residents 
Concerned for Quality Living,17 granted Pennsylvania's petition for a 
writ of certiorari to review the Third Circuit's holding that private 
rights of action exist under section 602.18 However, on August 17, 
1998, the Court dismissed the case as moot and vacated the Third 
Circuit's decision. 19 
OnJune 3, 1998, in Sandoval v. Hagan,20 the District Court for the 
Middle District of Alabama agreed with the Third Circuit regarding 
the existence of a private right of action under Section 602.21 
Although it was decided before the Supreme Court vacated Chester, 
the Sandoval court would likely have reached the same result even 
after the vacatur of the Third Circuit's decision.22 Sandoval remains 
good law. 
14. 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997), vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.), 1998 WL 477242 (1998); see 
infra notes 219-293 and accompanying text. 
15. See infra notes 219-293 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 255-270 and accompanying text. 
17. See Seif v. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living, 132 F. 3d 925 (3d Cir. 
1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 2296 (U.S. June 8, 1998) (No. 97-1620), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 22, 
67 U.S.L.W. 3155 (U.S. Aug. 17, 1998) (No. 97-1620); infra notes 294-300 and accompanying 
text. 
18. See Seif v. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living, 132 F. 3d 925 (3d Cir. 
1997), art. granted, 118 S. Ct. 2296 (U.S. June 8,1998) (No. 97-1620), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 22, 
67 U.S.L.W. 3155 (U.S. Aug. 17, 1998) (No. 97-1620); infra notes 294-300 and accompanying 
text. 
19. See No. 97-1620.119 S. Ct. 22 (1998); infra notes 300-303 and accompanying text. 
20. 7 F. Supp.2d 1234 (M.D. Ala. 1998). 
21. Id. at 1251-64 (M.D. Ala. 1998). 
22. See infra notes 304-315 and accompanying text. 
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Section II of this article will argue that minority populations are 
disproportionately affected by pollution. Section III explains why 
environmental justice plaintiffs have generally been unable to 
prove intentional discrimination in suits under the Equal 
Protection Clause. Section IV provides an introduction to Title VI 
and agency regulations promulgated pursuant to that statute. 
Section V examines the differences between administrative 
complaints and litigation of Title VI cases. Section VI discusses the 
Supreme Court's treatment of implied private rights of action. 
Section VII examines the District Court and Third Circuit decisions 
in Chester. Section VIII discusses why the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in Chester, found the case was moot, and vacated the 
Third Circuit's decision. Section IX examines the Sandoval 
decision. Section X infers congressional intent to establish a 
private right of action based on Section 602's purposes. 
The Supreme Court seems likely to decide this vital issue.23 This 
article will apply the Chester three-factor test to find a private right 
of action implied in the administrative regulations promulgated by 
various agencies to implement Section 602 of Title VI. This article 
also proposes that it would be inconsistent to apply today's more 
stringent standard for inferring congressional intent in deciding 
whether a private right exists under Section 602. Such 
inconsistency arises as a result of the Supreme Court's application 
of a more lenient standard in recognizing a private right of action 
under Section 601. 
II. SERIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL INEQUmES EXIST 
There is substantial evidence of racial disparities in 
environmental risks between racial minorities and whites. For 
instance, urban African-American children under the age of five 
have substantially higher lead levels in their blood than white 
children of similar age groups living in the same cities.24 Yet, there 
23. See Peyton Sturges, Environmental Justice: High Court Dismisses Challenge, Vacates Third 
Circuit Civil Rights Decision, 160 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) AA-l (Aug. 19,1998). 
24. See I ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY WORKGROUP, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 
Pub. No. EPA 230-R-92~08A, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RIsK FOR ALL 
COMMUNITIES, SUPPORTING DOCUMENT 15 (1992) [hereinafter EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY 
SUPPORTING DOCUMENT']; CHRlSfOPHER H. FOREMAN JR., THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 78-81 (1998) (acknowledging substantial evidence that minority 
children are exposed to higher levels of lead than white children, but arguing evidence of 
health impacts from those higher levels remain uncertain); Fisher, supra note 8, at 299. 
1999] The Need to Empower EnvironmentalJustice Plaintiffs 7 
is much controversy regarding whether waste storage facilities are 
disproportionately located in poor or minority areas.25 Other 
difficult questions concern whether the EPA and state agencies 
enforce environmental laws equally in white and minority areas.26 
Environmental inequities result from both omISSIons in 
environmental laws and from affirmative actions that, consciously 
or unconsciously, worsen existing inequalities.27 One major 
omission results from environmental laws that typically regulate 
only one medium (i.e., air, water or land) at a time and, as a result, 
ignore the cumulative or synergistic multimedia impacts of 
pollution.28 These cumulative impacts may be especially 
concentrated in low income and minority areas. The effects may 
be particularly harmful to members of minority groups who may be 
especially sensitive to the impacts of certain harmful pollutants.29 
Several studies conducted between 1983 and 1994 by 
government or private investigators found that various types of 
hazardous waste treatment or disposal facilities, solid waste 
repositories, pollution producing factories or other 
environmentally harmful facilities are located in communities that 
include, on average, a higher percentage of racial minorities and 
low-income persons than non-host communities.30 A number of 
25. See generaUy FOREMAN, supra note 24, at 18-27 (summarizing conflicting studies about 
whether hazardous waste sites are disproportionately located in minority population areas 
and arguing there is only weak evidence of disproportionate siting or exposure); infra notes 
30-36 and accompanying text. 
26. See Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in 
Environmental Law, M~t'l LJ., Sept. 21, 1992, at S2; Richard J. Lazarus, Essay, Fairness in 
Environmental Law, 27 ENVfL. L. 705, 713-714 (1997) [hereinafter Lazarus, Fairness]; Mank, 
Environmental Justice, supra note 5, at 337-39 (1995) (summarizing studies of discriminatory 
enforcement); but see FOREMAN, supra note 24, at 23-27 (arguing studies showing 
disproportionate enforcement of environmental laws harming minority groups are seriously 
flawed); John A. Hird, Environmental Policy and Equity: The Case of Superfund, 12]. POL 'y 
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 323, 337 (1993) (finding no relationship between pace at which sites are 
cleaned up and host county's socioeconomic characteristics); Thomas Lamben & 
Christopher Boerner, Environmental Inequity: Ecorunnic Causes, Economic Solutions, 14 YALE]. 
ON REG. 195, 199-200 n.16 (1997) (questioning National Law Journal study's definition of 
minority areas and failure to explore alternative explanations besides discrimination for 
disparities in fines such as forcing polluter to use corrective action to eliminate pollution 
rather than payment offine). 
27. See Lazarus, Fairness, supra note 26, at 712. 
28. See Lazarus, Fairness, supra note 26, at 712-13; Bradford C. Mank, The Environmental 
Protection Agent)"s Project XL and Other Regulatory Reform Initiatives: The Need for Legislative 
Authorization, 25 ECOLOGYL.Q. 1,7-9 (1998) [hereinafter Mank, Project XL]. 
29. See Lazarus, Fairness, supra note 26, at 712-13; Mank, Project XL. supra note 28, at 29-30. 
30. See 2 ENVfL. EQUflY WORKGROUP, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Pub. 
No. EPA 230-R-92-008A, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUflY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES, 
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recent studies have concurred with these findings.3l 
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SUPPORTING DOCUMENT 15 (1992) [hereinafter EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY SUPPORTING 
DOCUMENT] (concluding "available information suggests that racial minorities may have a 
greater potential for exposure to some pollutants because they tend to live in urban areas, are 
more likely to live near a waste site, or exhibit a greater tendency to rely on subsistence 
fishing for dietary protein."); Benjamin A. Goldman & Laura Fitton, Toxic Wast&s and Race 
Revisited (1994) (using zip code areas, finding that the location of hazardous waste facilities 
reflects a national pattern of racial inequality that has gotten worse during the past decade); 
UNITED CHURCH OF CHRISr COMM'N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE,ToXIC WASTES AND RACE IN THE 
UNITED STATES XIII (1987) (using zip code areas to define minority and nonminority areas, 
concluding that " [a]lthough socioeconomic status appeared to play an important role in the 
location of commercial hazardous waste facilities, race still proved to be more significant."; 
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OmCE, GAOjRCED-83-168, SITING OF HAzARDous WASTE LANDFILL'> 
AND THEIR CORRElATIONS WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING 
COMMUNITIES 1 (1983) (examining the racial and socioeconomic characteristics of the 
communities surrounding four offsite hazardous waste landfills located in the eight 
southeastern states that make up EPA's region N and finding that "[b]lacks make up the 
majority of the population in three of the four communities where the landfills are 
located."); Roben D. Bullard, Solid Waste Sit&s and the B/o.ck Houston Community, 53 SOC. 
INQUIRY 273, 279-83 (1983) (finding that although Mrican-Americans made up only 28% of 
the Houston population in 1980, six of Houston's eight incinerators and mini-incinerators 
and fifteen of seventeen landfills were located in predominantly Mrican-American 
neighborhoods); Mank, EnvironmentalJustice, supra note 5, at 334-41 (summarizing studies 
finding racial minorities and low-income persons live disproportionately near pollution); but 
see FOREMAN, supra note 24, at 1S-27 (summarizing conflicting studies about whether 
hazardous waste sites are disproportionately located in minority population areas and 
arguing there is only weak evidence of disproportionate siting or exposure); Andy B. 
Anderson et aI., Environmental Equity: Evaluating TSDF Siting Over the Past Two Decades, W ASfE 
AGE, July 1994, at 83 (reporting analysis based on 1990 census data and not finding 
significant evidence that minorities disproportionately live near hazardous waste facilities); 
Douglas L. Andenon et aI., Environmental Equity: The Demographics oj Dumping, 31 
DEMOGRAPHY 229 (1994) (reporting analysis based on 1980 census data, not finding 
significant evidence that minorities disproportionately live near hazardous waste facilities) 
31. See Vicki Been & Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the Barnos: A 
Longitudinal Analysis oJEnvironmentalJustice Clnims, 24 ECOLOGYL.Q. 1 (1997) 9, 19-27,33-34 
(using 1990 census data, examining 544 communities that hosted active commercial 
hazardous waste treatment storage and disposal facilities and finding no substantial evidence 
that commercial hazardous waste facilities that began operating between 1970 and 1990 
were sited in areas that were disproportionately Mrican American or with high 
concentrations of poor, but did find evidence that Hispanics were disproportionately more 
likely to live near such facilities);]. Tom Boer et aI., Is There Environmental Racism? The 
Demographics oj Hazardous Waste in Los Angeles County, 78 SOC. SCI. Q. 793 (1997) (finding 
working class communities of color in industrial areas of Los Angeles are most affected by 
hazardous waste treatment storage and disposal facilities); Evan]. Ringquist, Equity and the 
Distribution oj Environmental Risk: The Case oJTRl Facilities, 78 SOC. ScI. Q. 811 (1997) (finding 
Toxic Release Inventory facilities and pollutants are concentrated in residential ZIP codes 
with large minority populations); but see FOREMAN, supra note 24, at 1S-27 (summarizing 
conflicting studies about whether hazardous waste sites are disproportionately located in 
minority population areas and arguing there is only weak evidence of disproportionate 
siting or exposure); Lamben & Boerner, supra note 26, at 203-04 (using data from 1970, 
1980 and 1990 censuses, and finding no statistical relationship between active hazardous and 
solid waste storage facilities and incinerators and minority residents in St. Louis, but some 
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There are different explanations for such disproportionate siting 
patterns. One theory is that any disproportionality results from 
minorities or low-income groups "moving to the nuisance" after 
the fall of land values, rather than these. communities being 
targeted by developers.52 This "moving to the nuisance" hypothesis 
is a good defense to a disparate impact suit because a facility 
developer could not reasonably be liable for environmental racism 
if minorities voluntarily moved to an area near an existing facility." 
Although a study of one metropolitan area found evidence that 
"white flight" from areas housing hazardous and solid waste 
disposal facilities and incinerators resulted in an increasing 
proportion of minorities near such facilities,M a study of national 
housing patterns failed to find evidence that minorities or poor 
people tended to move toward existing facilities.55 Based on the 
limited evidence available, it appears that the "moving to the 
nuisance" problem occurs in a relatively small percentage of cases 
and, accordingly, does not undermine the general need to redress 
siting and permitting practices that cause discriminatory effects.36 
Proponents of environmental justice have sought legal avenues 
to challenge. allegedly discriminatory actions by government 
officials, particularly those by state or local decision-makers. 
weak relationship between minority and poor residents and facilities if inactive sites are 
added to the dataset). 
32. See Vicki Been. Locally Unlksirable Land USIfS in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate 
Siting ur Marllet Dynamics? 103 YALE LJ. 1383. 138492 (1994) [hereinafter Been. Marllet 
Dynamics]; Lambert & Boerner. supra note 26. at 205. 
33. See Fisher. supra note 8. at 29496. 
34. Lambert & Boerner. supra note 26. at 205 (using data from 1970. 1980 and 1990 
censuses. this srudy examined housing patterns around hazardous and solid waste disposal 
facilities and incinerators in SL Louis and found evidence that whites tended to move away 
from such facilities at a faster rate than minorities. and that awhite flight" led to an 
increasing proportion of minorities near such facilities) 
35. See Been & Gupta. supra note 31. at 9. 27-30. 34 (using 1990 census data and 
examining 544 communities that hosted active commercial hazardous waste treatment 
storage and disposal facilities. the srudy found little evidence the siting of a facility was 
followed by substantial changes in a neighborhood's socioeconomic status or racial or ethnic 
composition). 
36. See Fisher. supra note 8. at 29496. 
10 COLUMBlAjOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL lAw [Vol. 24:1 
III. EQUAL PROTECTION SUITS FAIL BECAUSE OF THE INTENTIONAL 
DISCRIMINATION REQUIREMENT 
In Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development 
Corporation37 and Washington v. Davis,'38 the Supreme Court held 
that, to prove a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff 
must demonstrate that government officials intentionally 
discriminated against them.39 While a plaintiff may use statistical 
evidence of disparate impacts to establish an inference of 
discriminatory intent,40 courts usually require the plaintiff to 
introduce at least some circumstantial evidence that the defendant 
intended to discriminate against an identifiable minority groUp.41 
Without this circumstantial evidence of conscious discrimination, 
courts usually refuse to find intentional discrimination even where 
there are gross disparities between whites and minority groupS.42 
37. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). Arlington Heights established a five-part test for conducting an 
equal" protection analysis: (1) "[t]he impact of the official action-whether it bears more 
heavily on one race than another;" (2) the historical background of the decision; (3) the 
series of events prior to the decision, which could reveal the decisionmaker's purpose; (4) 
any departures, substantive or procedural, from the normal decisionmaking process; and 
(5) the legislative and administrative history of the decision. 429 U.S. 252, at 266-68. The 
Coun later added the foreseeability of the adverse consequences as another factor to 
consider. See Rachel D. Godsil, Note, Remedying Enviremmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REv. 394, 
410 (1991) (citing Personnel Admr of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 n.25 (1979).) 
38.426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
39. Commentators have cited four major reasons for not adopting a discriminatory 
impact standard: (1) the impact standard would be too costly for the government; (2) under 
an "impact" standard, "innocent" people would bear the cost of remedying the harm and 
that a volitional element is essential to find a person guilty of discrimination; (3) the impact 
test is inconsistent with traditional equal protection doctrine, since the judicial 
decisionmaker would need to explicitly consider race; and (4) it would be inappropriate for 
the judiciary to remedy the impact of otherwise neutJal government action at the expense of 
other legitimate social interests. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 293-94 (1976); Milliken 
v. Bradley (MiUiken II), 418 U.S. 717, 738, 744-45 (1974); James F. Blumstein, D':/ining and 
Proving Race Discriminatitm: Perspectives em the Purposes vs. Results Approach from the Voting Rights 
Act, 69 VA. L. REv. 633, 643-45 (1983); but see Charles R Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and 
Equal Protectiem: Reckoning with Unccmscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 320-21 (1987) 
(criticizing Hill.s and MiUiken 11). 
40. See Arlingtem Heights, 429 U.S. 252, 266 (where a "clear pattern, unexplainable on 
grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state action even when the 
governing legislation appears neutral on its face; a coun may find "invidious" racial 
discrimination using that pattern as circumstantial evidence of intent.); Colopy, supra note 
11, at 146 n.88 .. 
41. SeeFeeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279; Colopy, supra note 11, at 147 n.92. 
42. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298-99 (1987) (refusing to find intentional 
discrimination based on gross disparities between whites and blacks in capital punishment 
rates for particular crimes). 
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Courts have failed to find evidence of intentional discrimination 
because siting boards and developers can almost always offer at 
least some race-neutral justification for a site.43 In addition, 
plaintiffs in equal protection cases often have been unable to 
provide "statistically significant" evidence of disparate impact 
because too few facilities exist in a particular geographical area to 
establish statistical significance.44 Thus, lawsuits alleging that 
government permitting officials or siting decision-makers have 
violated the Equal Protection Clause by engaging in discrimination 
have generally been unsuccessful because plaintiffs are unable to 
prove intentional discrimination.45 
Critics of the intentional discrimination standard argue that 
requiring plaintiffs to prove that an individual "bad" actor had a 
race conscious impetus approach prevents courts from addressing 
structural, indirect or vestigial effects of racism.46 These scholars 
often believe that courts have looked too narrowly at what 
constitutes racism.47 For instance, a court might examine only 
whether the agency responsible for the permit decision had a 
history of discrimination, but fail to address evidence regarding the 
history of state and municipal-wide discrimination.48 
It is clearly very difficult for an environmental justice plaintiff to 
prove that government decision-makers consciously discriminate 
against minority groups in violation of the Constitution's Equal 
Protection Clause. Some state constitutions or statutes may allow 
43. See gmerall:Y Colopy, supra note 11, at 145-5l. 
44. See Colopy, supra note 11, at ISO. 
45. See Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556 (11th Cir. 1996); Bowman v. City of Franklin, 980 F.2d 
1104 (7th Cir. 1992); RI.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1149-50 (E.D. Va. 1991), affd, 
977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992); East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v,. Macon-Bibb County 
Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880, 885-87 (M.D. Ga.), affd, 896 F.2d 1264 
(11th Cir. 1989); Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673. 677-78 
(S.D. Tex. 1979), affd, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1038 (5th Cir. 1986); Mank, Environmental 
Justice, supra note 5, at 376-83. 
46. See Lawrence, supra note 39, at 318-19 (arguing that antidiscrimination law is based 
upon a model of discrimination that is focused on individual actors through a "perpetrator" 
perspective); Omar Saleem, Overcoming Environmental Discrimination: Tile Need/or a Disparate 
Impact Test and Impruved Notice Requirements in Facility Siting Decisions, 19 CoLUM.J. ENVfL. L. 
211,225-28 (1994) ("In essence, courts narrowly construe the Equal Protection Clause to the 
detriment of groups that unfairly bear the brunt of environmental hazards under the guise 
of economic apportionment"). 
47. See Lazarus, supra note 5, at 831-33 (discussing several cases). 
48. See, e.g., East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & 
Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880,885-87 (M.D. Ga. 1989), affd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 
1989). 
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plaintiffs to prove discrimination based solely on evidence of 
discriminatory effects, but state courts are only now beginning to 
address such issues.49 
IV. TITLE VI PROHIBITS fuNDING RECIPIENTS FROM CREATING 
UNJUSTIFIED DISPARATE IMPACTS 
Because plaintiffs have been unsuccessful thus far in winning 
environmental discrimination claims under the Equal Protection 
Clause, advocates have turned the focus to Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act because it allows claims based on proof of unjustified 
disparate impacts.5o In fact, a major goal of Title VI and the EPA's 
Section 602 regulations is to prevent recipients of federal funds 
from engaging in practices that cause disparate impacts.51 
A. Section 602 Allows Disparate Impact Regulations 
1. Section 602 
Pursuant to Title VI, federal agencies may not provide funding to 
grant applicants that discriminate on the basis of race.52 Section 
602 of the statute requires every federal agency to issue regulations 
that delineate the manner in which the agency will resolve this 
issue of whether grant applicants or recipients are pursuing 
policies that have discriminatory impacts. It also mandates that 
federal agencies establish a framework for investigating and 
assessing complaints of racial discrimination filed with the agency.53 
49. See Michael B. Gerrard & Monica Jahan Bose, The Emerging Area of 1wtice, • 218 
N.Y.LJ.,July 25,1997, at 3. ' 
50. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 601-605, 78 Stat. 241, 252-53, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000d (1988); see generaUy Fisher, supra note 8, at passim; Lazarus, supra note 5, at 834-39; 
Mank, Environmental Justice, supra note 5, at 383-86; Saleem, supra note 46, at 228-29 
(discussing equal protection clause, Title VI, Title VIII and 42 U.S.C. $ 1982); Colopy, supra 
note II, at passim. 
51. See infra notes 54, 56, 67-73, 78-83 and accompanying text. 
52. Section 601 of the statute provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the 
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance." Civil Rights Act of1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 601-605, 78 Stat. 
241, 252-53, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988); see generaUy Lazarus, supra note 5, at 834-39; Mank, 
EnvironmentalJwtice, supra note 5, at 383-85; Saleem, supra note 46, at 228-29 (discussing 
equal protection clause, Title VI, Title VIII and 42 U.S.C. § 1982); Colopy, supra note 11, at 
passim. 
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (1988); Colopy, supra note 11, at 155. 
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Since Congress enacted Title VI in 1964, the government has 
consistently interpreted Section 602 to allow federal agencies to 
deny funding to applicants that engage in practices having 
discriminatory effects.54 
2. Section 602 Disparate Impact Regulations Are Valid 
Under Section 601 of Title VI, the Supreme Court has required 
plaintiffs to prove a reCIpIent intentionally discriminated. 
However, it has also held that an agency may promulgate 
implementing regulations pursuant to Section 602 that prohibit 
recipients from engaging in practices causing disparate impact 
discrimination. The confusing and unconvincing distinction 
between these two sections continues to cause difficulties for Title 
VI plaintiffs. 
a. Supreme Court Cases 
In 1974, in Lau v. Nichols55 , the Supreme Court held that· a 
plaintiff could prove a violation of the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare's (HEW) Section 602 regulations relying 
solely on evidence of disparate impact because "[d]iscrimination is 
barred which has that effect even though no purposeful design is 
present.,,56 However, in 1978, in Regents of California v. Bakkl7 , the 
Supreme Court raised questions about Lau's "effects standard." 
The Court suggested that proof of intentional discrimination was 
necessary to establish a violation of the various civil rights statutes, 
including Title VI.58 
In 1983, in Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Seroice Commission59, a divided 
Supreme Court issued a complex multipart opinion that 
54. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 618 (1983) (Marshall,].) 
(recipients may not use "'criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of 
subjecting individuals to discrimination,'"quoting 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1964); Guardians, 
463 U.S. 582, at 592 n.13 (White,].) (observing "every Cabinet department and about forty 
agencies adopted Title VI regulations prohibiting disparate-impact discrimination."; see 
Sidney D. Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI: Defending Health Care Discrimination-It Shouldn't Be 
So Easy, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 939, 947-48 (1990) (noting presidential task force in 1964 
assisted federal agencies in promulgating comparable disparate impact regulations under 
Title VI). 
55. 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
56. Lau, 414 U.S. 563, at 568, 570 (citing 35 Fed. Reg. 11,595 (1970»; See also Lazarus, 
supra note 5, at 834-35. 
57. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
58. See Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, at 318-19; see also Colopy, supra note 11, at 158. 
59. 463 U.S. 582 (1983). 
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demanded proof of intentional discrimination under Section 601 
of Title VI, hut also held that agency implementing regulations 
under Section 602 may prohibit disparate impact discrimination. 50 
In Guardians, a class of black and Hispanic police officers filed suit 
alleging that several written examinations used by the New York 
City Police Department, to make entry-level hiring decisions and to 
determine lay offs among officers with equal seniority, had a 
discriminatory impact on minority candidates and officers.61 
Relying on the Department of Labor's Title VI regulations, which 
prohibited grantees from operating programs that had racially 
discriminatory effects,62 the District Court for the Southern District 
of New York held that proof of discriminatory effect was sufficient 
to establish a violation of Title VI and awarded the plaintiffs 
compensatory relief. 53 However, the Second Circuit reversed the 
district court's decision, holding that Title VI required proof of 
discriminatory intent and thus deemed it improper to award 
compensatory relief based on allegations of disparate impacts.54 
In Guardians, seven members of the Supreme Court agreed that 
proof of discriminatory intent is required by the statute in Section 
601.65 Justices White and Marshall each argued in dissent that 
showing disparate impacts was sufficient to prove a violation under 
Section 601.66 In addition, five members of the Court Uustices 
White, Marshall, Stevens, Brennan and Blackmun) concluded that 
Section 602 of Title VI permits federal agencies to promulgate 
regulations that prohibit disparate impact discrimination.67 Justice 
60. Id. at 584 n.2. 
61. See Guardians, 463 U.S. 582, at 584. 
62. See 29 C.F.R. § 31.3(c)(I). 
63. See Guardians, 463 U.S. 582, at 582; id. 466 F. Supp. 1273, 1285-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
64. See Guardians, 463 U.S. 582, at 582; id. 633 F.2d 232, 270 (2d Cir. 1980) (Kelleher,J., 
concurring); id. at 274 (Coffrin,j., concurring). 
65. See Guardians, 463 U.S. 582, at 610-11 (Powell,j., concurring in judgment, joined by 
Burger, CJ. & Rehnquist,j.); id. at 615 (O'Connor,j. concurring injudgment); id. at 64245 
(Stevens, dissenting, joined by Brennan & Blackmun,lJ.); Colopy, supra note II, at 159. 
66. See id. 463 U.S. 582, at 584 & n.2, 589-93 (White, j.); id. at 615, 623 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
67. "The threshold issue before the Court is whether the private plaintiffs in this case 
need to prove discriminatory intent to establish a violation ofTicle VI ... and administrative 
implementing regulations promulgated thereunder. I conclude, as do four other Justices, 
in separate opinions, the Court of Appeals erred in requiring proof of discriminatory 
intent." Guardians, 463 U.S. 582, at 584 (White, j., delivering judgment of the Court) 
(citations and footnotes omitted); see Guardians, 463 U.S. 582, at 584 & n.2 (White, J., 
deliveringjudgment of the Court); id. at 64245 (Stevens,j.,joined by Brennan & Blackmun, 
lJ.); id at 623 (Marshall,j.); Lazarus, supra note 5, at 835; Colopy, supra note 11, at 159. 
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Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, concluded that 
intentional discrimination is a necessary element under Section 
601 of Title VI, but that regulations promulgated pursuant to 
Section 602 may only require a disparate impact standard.68 
Justices White and Marshall would have allowed disparate impact 
suits under either Sections 601 or 602.69 
In 1985, in Alexander v. Choate,70 the Supreme Court addressed 
the issue of whether a showing of disparate impacts constituted a 
prima facie case under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973.71 Because Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act was modeled 
on Title VI and contains nearly identical language to both Titles VI 
and IX, Alexander interpreted Section 504 in light of Title VI and 
Title IX case law.72 Alexander unanimously interpreted Quardians to 
authorize agencies to issue Title VI regulations that defined 
impermissible disparate impacts discrimination: "The [Guardians] 
Court held that actions having an unjustifiable, disparate impact on 
minorities could be redressed through agency regulations designed 
to implement the purposes of Title VI."73 The Alexander Court 
explained that Congress had "delegated to the agencies in the first 
instance the complex determination of what sorts 'of disparate 
impacts upon minorities constituted significant social problems, 
and were readily enough remedial, to warrant altering the practices 
of the federal grantees that had produced these impacts.,,74 
b. Analysis 
The Guardian Court's distinction between Sections 601 and 602 
is unconvincing. There is no evidence that Congress intended to 
require different standards of proof under these two sections. 
Unfortunately, in 1964, the original enacting Congress did not 
address the standard of proof under Title VI. However, Congress 
68. See itl. at 641-45 (Stevens, BTennan Be Blacltmun,.u., dissenting). 
69. See itl. 463 U.S. 582, at 584 Be n.2, 589-93 (White, j.); id. at 615, 623 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) . 
70. 469 U.S. 287 (1985). 
71. See id. at 290-91; Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 87 Stat. 394, 29 U.S.C. § 794 
72. See Alexander, 469 U.S. 287, at 295 (explaining that section 504 was originally pToposed 
as an amendment to Title VI); see also United States Dep't ofTransp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of 
Am., 477 U.S. 597, 600 (1986) (section 504 and its Tegulations weTe modeled afteT Title VI); 
Colopy, supra note 11, at 151).57 n.I40; but see Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 
624,632-33 n.13 (1984) (Tecognizing diffeTences between Title VI and Section 504). 
73. [d. at 293. 
74. Alexander, 469 U.S. 287, at 293-94. 
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has clearly acquiesced to federal agencies rsromulgating disparate 
impact regulations pursuant to Section 602. 5 
If it had interpreted the statute in the absence of existing 
disparate impact regulations, the Court might have required proof 
of intentional discrimination under both sections. Because many 
agencies had promulgated and relied upon disparate impact 
regulations for nineteen years before the Court decided Guardians, 
some members of the Court were unwilling to impose the same 
restrictive interpretation of Section 601 onto Section 602, which 
would have essentially invalidated those regulations.76 Hence, the 
Court adopted the dubious and unconvincing distinction between 
Sections 601 and 602. 
The Court should interpret Section 601 to allow suits based upon 
disproportionate effects. Litigation involving the Equal Protection 
Clause's intent requirement has demonstrated that it is too difficult 
for plaintiffs to prove that a government official has consciously 
discriminated. Furthermore, Title VI's dual purposes of 
preventing recipient discrimination and protecting individual 
rights would be better served by a disparate impact standard.77 
However, it is more likely that the Court will continue to follow 
Guardians' unconvincing distinction between Sections 601 and 602. 
B. EPA's Title VI Regulations 
Title VI prohibits any discrimination by federal fund recipients, 
even if the discrimination occurs in a separate program or 
subprogram of the recipient that does not receive such assistance.78 
The EPA currently provides federal funding to at least one 
program in virtually all state or regional siting or permitting 
agencies.79 Hence, Title VI clearly applies to these agencies. 
75. See generally infra notes 237-242 and accompanying text. 
76. See generaUy supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. 
77. See generally infra notes 282-286, 317-320 and accompanying text. 
78. However, Title VI does not apply to federal programs that pay benefits directly to 
individual beneficiaries. See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 38-39 (2d Cir. 1983); 
Colopy, supra note II, at 154. • 
79. See u.s. EPA, Amicus Curiae Brief at 5, Chester Residents Concerned for Quality 
Living v. Seif, (3d Cir. ) (No. 97-1125) [hereinafter EPA Amicus Brief]; Lazarus, supra note 
5, at 835-36 (citing u.s. EPA, A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE PuBUC CoSTS OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: 1981-2000, at 9 (1988» (reporting in 1986 the federal 
government provided 46% of the funding for state air pollution programs, 33% of the 
funding for state water pollution programs, and 40% of the funding for state hazardous 
waste programs); Colopy, supra note II, at 154-55. 
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However, some local environmental programs receive no federal 
funding. so Thus, these programs are exempt from Title VI's 
jurisdiction. 
1. EPA's Disparate Impact Regulations 
The EPA's Section 602 regulations have consistently prohibited a 
recipient from engaging in actions having discriminatory effects.8! 
The EPA's current regulations reiterate its historic policy of 
forbidding recipients from creating disparate impacts: «A recipient 
[of federal funds] shall not use criteria or methods of 
administering its program which have the effect of subjecting 
individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, [or] 
national origin."82 Furthermore, EPA regulations mandate that 
state recipients maintain Title VI compliance programs addressing 
both discrimination by the state and any beneficiaries of state-
administered funds.83 
2. EPA's Early Failure to Enforce Title VI 
Despite these Title VI regulations, the EPA avoided enforcing 
Title VI from the early 1970s until 1993.84 Initially, the EPA 
maintained that the agency had only limited responsibility to 
enforce Title VI because its central task is regulating pollution 
rather than addressing broader discriminatory practices such as 
housing discrimination by state or local recipients.85 The agency 
also avoided enforcing the statute because terminating grants to an 
allegedly discriminating recipient under Title VI would undermine 
the EPA's basic goal of providing financial assistance to state and 
local agencies for the purpose of reducing pollution.86 Moreover, 
80. See Colopy, supra note 11, at 173. 
81. See 38 Fed. Reg. 17,968, 17,969 (1973) (providing a recipient may not "direcdy or 
indirecdy, utilize criteria or methods of administration which have or may have the effect of 
subjecting a person to discrimination because of race, color, or national origin."); EPA 
Amicus Brief, supra note 79, at 5. 
82. See 49 Fed. Reg. 1,661 (1984) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b». 
83. See28C.F.R.§42.410. 
84. See Fisher, supra note 8, at 313-14; Lazarus, supra note 5, at 836-38 (discussing EPA's 
decision to deemphasize its civil rights responsibilities under Tide VI); Saleem, supra note 
46, at 228 (arguing that EPA's stance that its decisionmaking was exempt from Tide VI "lacks 
suppon from any internal policy or legal precedent."); Colopy, supra note 11, at 180-88 
(discussing history of EPA's enforcement ofits Tide VI regulations). 
85. See Fisher, supra note 8, at 313-14; Lazarus, supra note 5, at 836-38; Colopy, supra note 
11, at 181-82. 
86. See Fisher, supra note 8, at 313-14; Lazarus, supra note 5, at 836-38; Colopy, supra note 
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recipients might refuse to stop discriminating even if the agency 
terminated its funding. s7 Furthermore, the funding termination 
sanction might adversely affect minority groups rather than help 
them.88 
3. The Clinton Administration Uses Title VI to Promote 
Environmentaljustice, But Problems Remain 
A change occurred in 1993 when the newly elected Clinton 
Administration announced that the EPA would finally begin to 
meet its Title VI responsibilities by enforcing its long-standing 
regulations against recipients that engage in discrimination.89 In 
1994, the EPA created an Office of Civil Rights to handle Title VI 
issues.90 Between September 1993 and August 1998, approximately 
fifty-eight environmental justice complaints were filed with the 
agency.9) The overwhelming majority of these complaints 
challenged state or local permit decisions.92 
Both environmental justice advocates and opponents continually 
complain of the agency's slow and secretive process in conducting 
investigations.93 Advocates are especially distrustful because that 
the agency has never found a recipient in violation of the statute.94 
While the EPA has dismissed a number of claims lacking sufficient 
evidence,95 the agency has failed to resolve at least fifteen pending 
11, at 181-82. 
87. See Fisher, supra note 8, at 313-14; Lazarus, supra note 5, at 836-38; Colopy, supra note 
II, at 181-82. 
88. See Fisher, supra note 8, at 313-14; Lazarus, supra note 5, at 836-38; Colopy, supra note 
11, at 181-82. 
89. See Fisher, supra note 8, at 314-15. 
90. See Natalie M. Hammer, Title VI as a Means of Achieving EnvirunmentalJustia, 16 N. ILL. 
U.L.REv. 693, 711 (1996). 
91. Prepared Testimony of Anne Goode, Director of Civil Rights, U.S. EPA, Before The 
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Commerce 
Committee, Federal News Service, Aug. 6,1998,1998 WL 12763096. 
92. Prepared Testimony of Anne Goode, Director of Civil Rights, U.S. EPA, Before The 
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Commerce 
Committee, Federal News Service, Aug. 6,1998,1998 WL 12763096. 
93. See Domike & Ray, supra note 3, at Cl; David Masno, EPA Keeps Key Documents Secret: 
They Contradict New Agmty Polity un EnvironmentalJustia, Detroit News,July 17, 1998, at AI. 
94. See Domike & Ray, supra note 3, at Cl; David Mastio, Murky Rules Stall EPA Race Polity: 
After 5 years, $50 milliun, Agmty Hasn't Solved One Claim of Civil Rights Vwlations, Detroit News, 
Oct. 20, 1998, at AI. 
95. See FOREMAN, supra note 24, at 57 (reporting that of first thirty Tide VI complaints 
filed with EPA, agency rejected twelve and one was withdrawn because of insufficient 
evidence). 
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Title VI complaints.96 The Office of Civil Rights' limited staff and 
significant staff turnover has slowed its investigations.97 
Furthermore, strong internal disagreements within the agency 
about how to define civil rights violations has hampered the 
resolution of complaints.98 In March 1998, the EPA created a new 
advisory committee to advise the agency on ways to improve the 
monitoring of Title VI compliance.99 
Additionally, there has been much controversy about the amount 
of evidence needed to prove discrimination. In February 1998, the 
EPA issued an "Interim Guidance for Investigating Title VI 
Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits."lOo Numerous 
state officials, local officials, and industry spokespersons have 
argued that the interim guidance is unclear about which types of 
siting decisions constitute discrimination pursuant to Title VI.lol As 
a result, this lack of clarity makes it too difficult to site new projects 
in minority areas because developers and government decision-
makers are uncertain about which projects are acceptable. 102 Some 
critics have asked the agency to rescind the interim guidance. 103 In 
response to these criticisms, the EPA has asked its Title VI advisory 
committee and the agency's independent Science Advisory Board 
to make recommendations regarding improving the interim 
guidance.104 It has also promised to issue a revised, final guidance 
in the spring of 1999.105 
96. See Mastio, Murky Rules StaUEPA Race Policy, supra note 93, atAI. 
97. See FOREMAN, supra note 24, at 57-58 (reporting lack of staff hinders EPA's 
investigation of Tide VI complaints); Domike & Ray, supra note 3, at Cl (same); Mastio, 
Murky Rules StaU EPA Race Policy, supra note 93, at Al (reporting rapid staff turnover thwarts 
EPA's investigation of Tide VI complaints). 
98. See Mastio, Murky Rules StaU EPA Race Policy, supra note 93, at AI. 
99. New EPA Advisory Committee to Address Rights Concerns on State, Local Permitting, 28 Env't 
Rep. (BNA) 2441 (March 20, 1998). 
100. See EPA, Interim Guidance for Investigating Tide VI Administrative Complaints 
Challenging Permits (Feb. 1998); Cheryl Hogue, EPA Issues Guidancefor Investigating ClLlims 
that State, Local Permits Are Discriminatory, 66 U.S. LAw WEEK (Legal News), at 2504 (Feb. 24, 
1998). 
101. See FOREMAN, supra note 24, at 59; John H. Cushman, Jr., PoUution Policy is Unfair 
Burden, States TeUEPA, New York Times, May 9,1998, at 1; Goode, supra note 91; Sean Paige, 
Green Light to Urban Blight, Insight,July 27,1998, at 12. 
102. See FOREMAN, supra note 24, at 59; Cushman, supra note 101, at 1; Goode, supra note 
91; Mastio, EPA Keeps Key Documents Secret, supra note 93, atAl; Paige, supra note 101, at 12. 
103. See Goode, supra note 91; Paige, supra note 101, at 12. 
104. See Goode, supra note 91; Environmental Justice: EPA Interim Guidance Spurs Ongoing 
Debate Over State, Federal Roles, Solid Waste Report, Sept. 10, 1998. 
105. See Goode, supra note 91; Environmental Justice: EPA Interim Guidance Spurs Ongoing 
Debate Over State, Federal Roles, Solid Waste Report, Sept. 10, 1998. 
20 COLUMBIAJOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL lAw [Vol. 24:1 
During October 1998, President Clinton signed an 
appropriations bill that included a rider sponsored by Republican 
members of Congress that places a moratorium on the EPA 
accepting new Title VI complaints until the agency issues a final 
guidance on Title VI. I06 The legislation does not affect fifteen 
ongoing investigations. IO? Opponents of the Interim Guidance 
argue that the moratorium is a warning to the EPA to adopt a more 
flexible approach to efforts to site facilities in minority or low-
income communities. lOB However, environmental justice advocates 
contend that the moratorium will have little practical impact 
because the EPA did not have the resources to investigate new 
cases and was going to delay considering new cases until it issues its 
final Title VI policy.l09 
v. Is IT BEITER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ADVOCATES TO FILE 
AN ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT OR A lAWSUIT? 
A. Administrative Complaints Under Title VI 
Under the EPA's Title VI regulations, complainants have limited 
rights. Therefore, environmental justice advocates often prefer to 
sue in federal court. 
1. Filing an Administrative Complaint 
It is relatively simple to file a Title VI complaint with the EPA. A 
complainant must file a statement alleging that a federal funds 
recipient engages in discriminatory practices. 110 The complaint 
must be filed within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory action. 
However, complainants can request waiver of this time limit for 
good cause.l\l Within twenty days of receiving a complaint, the 
106. See Appropriations Act for Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban 
Development and Independent Agencies for Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1999, Pub. 
L. No. 105-276 (H.R 4194), 112 StaL 2461, 105th Congo tit. III (1998); Cindy Skrzycki, The 
Regulaturs: With EPA as JudgtrUp Against the Environmental Justice System, Washington Post, Oct. 
23, 1998, at Fl; Bill Walsh, Law Puts EPA Bias Rules on Hold: Industry Targets Racism Probes, 
New Orleans Time-Picayune, Oct. 23, 1998, at AS. 
107. SeeSkrzycki, supra note 106, at F1; Walsh, supra note 106, at AS. 
108. SeeSkrzycki, supra note 106, at F1; Walsh, supra note 106, at AS. 
109. SeeSkrzycki, supra note 106, at F1; Walsh, supra note 106, at AS. 
110. See 40 C.F.R § 7.120; Luke W. Cole, Civil Rights, EnvironmentalJustice and the EPA: A 
Brief History of Administrative Complaints Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 9 J. ENVfL. 
L. & LITIG. 309, 314-15, 319 (1994); Hammer, supra note 90, at 710-11. 
Ill. See 40 C.F.R § 7.120(b) (2); Cole, supra note 110, at 315-16. So far the EPA has not 
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EPA will conduct a preliminary investigation to detennine whether 
the complaint states a valid claim of discrimination and is within 
the agency's jurisdiction.112 If the complaint is found to be invalid 
or is deemed outside of the EPA's jurisdiction, the agency will 
reject the complaint or refer it to another agency with appropriate 
jurisdiction. lI3 Alternatively, if the EPA accepts the complaint for 
• ., 111 th all ks . fi I tl 115 mvestlgatlon, e agency usu y see an m onna set ement. 
If infonnal negotiations between the parties fail, the EPA then 
conducts a fonnal investigation of the allegations. 1I6 
Recipients have far greater procedural rights than complainants. 
If the EPA fonnally concludes that a recipient has violated the 
statute or the agency's Section 602 regulations, the recipient may 
within thirty days request an opportunity for a hearing before an 
administrative law judge (ALJ) to contest the finding.117 
Subsequent to the ALl's findings, the recipient may appeal the 
decision to the EPA Administrator. IIB The Administrator has the 
authority to refuse, postpone or discontinue agency funding to the 
"particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance 
has been found." However, before the agency can punish the 
recipient, the Administrator must make a full report about such a 
decision to the congressional committees with legislative authority 
over the affected program and give Congress thirty days to 
respond. lI9 If the EPA decides to tenninate funding, a recipient 
may seek judicial review of the decision. l20 Before revoking 
funding, a federal agency usually encourages a recipient to 
negotiate a settlement in which the recipient promises that it will 
been receptive to waiver requests. See Cole, supra note 110, at 315 n.I8. A complaint 
alleging a continuing violation is timely if the last incident occurred within 180 days. See id. 
112. See 40 C.F.R § 7.120(d) (1). 
113. See 40 C.F.R § 7.120(d)(I). 
114. See 40 C.F.R § 7.120(d)(I); Cole, supra note 110, at 316-17; Domike & Ray, supra 
note 3, at Cl. 
115. See 40 C.F.R § 7.120(d)(2); Cole, supra note 110, at 316-17; Domike & Ray, supra 
note 3, at Cl. 
116. See 40 C.F.R § 7.115(a) (authorizing EPA's Office of Civil Rights to conduct 
compliance reviews, including the request of information and on-site reviews); Domike & 
Ray, supra note 3, at Cl. 
117. See 40 C.F.R § 7.130(b)(1)-(3); Cole, supra note 110, at 317-18; Colopy, supra note 11, 
at 129, 155. 
118. See 40 C.F.R § 7.130(b)(1)-(3); Cole, supra note 110, at 317-18; Colopy, supra note 11, 
at 129,155. 
119. See 40 C.F.R § 7.130(b)(3)(iii); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-I; Cole, supra note 110, at 317-18; 
Colopy, supra note 11, at 129, 155. 
120. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2. 
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eliminate its discriminatory practices.121 
If the Office of Civil Rights finds insufficient evidence that the 
recipient violated the statute, the agency will notify both the 
recipient and complainant of its dismissal of the complaint. l22 In 
this event, the complainant's right to appeal is extremely limited. 123 
2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Title VI Administrative 
Complaints 
The Complainant faces several disadvantages in pursuing a Title 
VI administrative complaint.124 Most importantly, a complainant 
has no right to participate in the agency's investigation, aside from 
providing specific information at the request of the agency.125 
Another problem lies in the lack of a time limitation constraining 
the EPA's response to the complainant. l26 In at least four cases, the 
EPA has reopened completed investigations to search for 
additional information about the type of pollution involved and 
the demographic composition of the surrounding population.127 
Furthermore, even if the EPA finds that a federal funds recipient 
has engaged in discrimination, the agency has only a limited ability 
to punish a discriminating recipient and can provide no direct 
compensation to the complainant. The primary remedy that the 
agency may impose against a discriminatory recipient is 
121. SeeWashington Legal Foundation, 984 F.2d 483, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Colopy, supra 
note 11, at 155. 
122. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.120(g). 
123. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 715 (1979) (suggesting that Title 
VI generally does not allow private suits against the federal government); Fisher, supra note 
8, at 317 n.158 (APA precludes suits challenging dismissal of Title VI complaint both 
because the complainant can file a private suit under Title VI and traditional deference 
accorded to executive agencies in deciding whetherto prosecute a case); Colopy, supra note 
11, at 168-71 (same). 
124. See Cole, supra note 110, at 321-24. 
125. Cannon v. University of Chicago 441 U.S. 677, 706 n.41 (1979); Arthur R. Block, 
Enfurcement of Title VI Compliance Agreements by Third Party Beneficiaries, 18 HARv. C.R...c.L. L. 
REv. 1, 10 (1983) (complainant has no official standing in Title VI administrative complaint 
process); Cole, supra note 110, at 321; Fisher, supra note 8, at 316. 
126. Mastio, Murky Rules StaU EPA Race Policy, supra note 93, at Al (reporting EPA has 
reopened and delayed completing investigations in at least four cases). The EPA's failure to 
expeditiously complete investigations may be a trap for unwary complainants who do not file 
a private suit until after the agency finishes its investigation because filing an administrative 
complaint does not toll the statute oflimitations for filing a Title VI suit. See Cole, supra note 
110, at 321-22; Hammer, supra note 90, at 711. 
127. Mastio, Murky Rules SlaU EPA Race Policy, supra note 93, at Al (reporting EPA has 
reopened and delayed completing investigations in at least four cases). 
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tennination of the recipient's funding. 128 However, despite 
evidence of discriminatory practices by a recipient, the EPA may be 
reluctant to withdraw funding for important pollution control 
programs that provide benefits to the public and even perhaps to 
some members of the complaining minority groUp.l29 Finally, the 
agency cannot provide any direct relief or attorneys fees to the 
complainant. l30 However, despite these disadvantages associated 
with filing an administrative complaint, a complainant may use the 
EPA's investigation of a complaint as a means to organize political 
opposition to a project.131 It is likely that a recipient, usually in 
coordination with a private pennit applicant, will agree to cancel or 
relocate a project that the EPA concludes will cause discriminatory 
effects because it is usually less expensive to settle with the agency 
than to challenge findings of discrimination.132 Also, if the EPA 
finds evidence of discrimination by a recipient, the agency would 
likely negotiate a settlement in which the recipient promises not to 
discriminate in the future. 133 
B. Advantages and Disadvantages of Private Lawsuits 
A litigant in federal court has greater rights than an 
administrative complainant. As previously mentioned, the 
complainant has no fonnal role in the agency's administrative 
investigation/34 and has limited judicial review rights. 135 Conversely, 
128. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.130; Fisher, supra note 8, at 316; Colopy, supra note 11, at 178-80. 
129. See supra notes 8488 and accompanying text. 
130. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.130(a); Hammer, supra note 90, at 711. 
131. See generally FOREMAN, supra note 24, at 34-63 (observing advocates often use 
complaints about environmental justice issues to mobilize community opposition to a 
project); Sheila Foster, Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, 
and the Transfurmative Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 775 
(1998) (same). 
132. It is often less expensive to relocate a project than even to contest a Title VI 
complaint. For instance, after environmental justice advocates filed a Title VI complaint and 
EPA began a lengthy investigation, the Shintech company decided not to build a proposed 
plastics plant in heavily minority Convent, Louisiana, but instead to construct a smaller 
factory in nearby Plaquemine. See Mark Schleifstein, Shintech Taking Its Plant Upriver, New 
Orleans Time-Picayune, Sept. 18, 1998, at AI; Traci Watson, La. Toum Successful in SlIJf1Iing 
Plastics Plant, USA TODAY, Sept. 18, 1998, at 7A 
133. See supra notes 115, 121 and accompanying text. 
134. See Cole, supra note 110, at 323; Colopy, supra note 11, at 167; supra note 125 and 
accompanying text. 
135. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 715 (1979) (suggesting that Title 
VI generally does not allow private suits against the federal government); Fisher, supra note 
8, at 317 n.158 (APA precludes suits challenging dismissal of Title VI complaint both 
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a lawsuit allows a plaintiff to use discovery procedures to direct her 
own investigation, to tender witnesses or evidence, and to cross-
examine a defendant's witnesses. l36 Additionally, a court may 
award prospective equitable relief to a plaintiff who establishes a 
case of disparate impacts and retroactive relief to a plaintiff who 
proves intentional discrimination.137 Moreover, prevailing Title VI 
plaintiffs are also entitled to reasonable attorney's fees. ISS 
Additionally, a plaintiff who loses in district court may appeal that 
decision to a federal appellate court. 
Furthermore, a lawsuit may provide the advantage of mobilizing 
political opposition in the affected community. This may result in 
the recipient or a permit applicant canceling the project.139 There 
are also disadvantages involved in filing a suit rather than a 
complaint. The primary disadvantage of a private right of action is 
the high cost of hiring a lawyer to investigate the issues, initiate 
discovery requests against opponents, and conduct a trial. 140 
Furthermore, a private litigant may fail to obtain the specific 
injunctive remedies and attorneys fees sought by the complaint. 141 
Alternatively, filing an administrative complaint is less expensive 
than pursuing a Title VI suit in federal court. An administrative 
complainant does not have to hire a lawyer, and a complainant can 
rely on the EPA to conduct an investigation.H2 Yet the advantages 
of filing a private right of action seem to far outweigh the 
d · d 143 Isa vantages. 
because the complainant can file a private suit under Tide VI and traditional deference 
accorded to executive agencies in deciding whether to prosecute a case); Colopy, supra note 
11, at 167-71 (same); see all-o Cole, supra note 110, at 323; supra note 123 and accompanying 
text. 
136. See Colopy, supra note 11, at 167. 
137. See Colopy, supra note 11, at 167. 
138. See Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act ofl976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Because the 
Awards statute does not clearly waive sovereign immunity, plaintiffs cannot recover fees 
against the federal government. See Shannon v. United States, 433 F. Supp. 249, 251 (E.D. 
Pa. 1977); Colopy, supra note 11, at 166 n.194. 
139. See Cole, supra note 110, at 323. 
140. See Block, supra note 125, at 12. 
141. See Block, supra note 125, at 12. 
142. See Cole, supra note 110, at 314-15,319. 
143. See gmeraUy Block, infra note 125, at 8-12. 
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VI. TITLE VI AND IMPUED RIGHTS OF ACTION 
In Guardians, the Supreme Court clearly established that Section 
601 of Title VI creates a private right of action.144 A more difficult 
issue, left unresolved by the Court, is whether there is an implied 
private right of action under the administrative regulations 
promulgated by various federal agencies to implement Section 602 
of Title VI. 
A. The Judicial Development of Private Rights of Action 
Courts freely recognize private rights of action based on statutory 
standards in two types of suits. 145 First, the common law doctrine of 
negligence per se allows plaintiffs to use a statutory standard to 
define the level of reasonable care owed by the defendant. 
However, the statute does not create a new right of action, but 
merely sets the boundaries for the common law duty of reasonable 
care. Second, legislatures may expressly authorize persons 
claiming to be injured by violations of regulatory statutes to bring 
suit directly against the alleged violator. l46 
A much more controversial issue is whether a regulatory statute 
that does not expressly create a private right of action may do so 
implicitly. 147 Some courts refuse to create a private right of action 
unless there is clear evidence that the legislature intended to allow 
this type of suit. Courts reason that they should refrain from 
usurping the legislative function of defining the appropriate 
remedies for violations of regulatory statutes and that courts should 
not interfere with the ability of executive agencies to decide how to 
enforce a statute within the agency's jurisdiction.148 Other courts 
will imply a private right of action if it will advance a statute's goals 
and if it is compatible with the statute's structure, explicit judicial 
remedies and administrative scheme.149 
From 1916 through the early 1960s, the Supreme Court rarely 
144. See infra notes 65-66, 68-69 and accompanying text. 
145. SeeRICHARDJ. PIERCE ET AL.,ADMINiSTRATIVE LAw AND PROCESS 327 (2d ed. 1992) 
146. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Clean Air Act); 15 U.S.C. §§ 4,15 (antitrust suits). 
147. See generally Susan J. Stabile, The Role of Ctmgressional Intent in Determining the Existence 
of Implied Private lOghts of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 861 (1996); Richard B. Stewan & 
Cass R Sunstein, Public Programs and Private lOghts, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1193 (1982). 
148. See PIERCE ET AL., supra note 145, at 329-30; Stewan & Sunstein, supra note 147, at 
1199 (summarizing "formalist" case against inferring private rights of action); infra notes 
182-190 and accompanying text. 
149. See infra notes 151-154 and accompanying text. 
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implied a private right of action from a regulatory statute. The 
exceptions to this practice, of not implying private suits, were cases 
dealing primarily with suits by transportation workers against their 
employers. lso However, in JI. Case Co. v. Borak,15I the Supreme 
Court liberalized its stance regarding implied private rights of 
action and held that Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (SEC Act) created an implied right of action for alleged 
violations of Section 14(a). The Court allowed the private right of 
action because these types of suits would further the statute's 
purposes.IS2 The Court took into consideration that the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) favored creating a private right 
of action because the Commission lacked the resources to either 
review in appropriate detail all of the thousands of proxy 
statements issued by corporations each year or to bring 
enforcement actions against all companies that arguably violated 
section 14(a).ls3 Following Borak, some cases between 1964 and 
1975 implied a private right of action from regulatory statutes. l54 
Nonetheless, courts generally remained cautious about inferring 
that such rights exist. l55 
In Cart v. Ash/56 the Supreme Court refused to imply a private 
cause of action under a federal statute prohibiting corporations 
150. See Cannon, 441 U.S. 677, 732-35 (Powell, j., dissenting) (discussing history of 
Supreme Court decisions allowing or denying private rights of action); Stabile, supra note 
147, at 865; see generally International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 
682 (1963); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); see also 
Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916) (arguably creating a private cause of action 
based on employer's violation of Federal Safety Appliance Acts, presently codifll!d at 45 U.S.C. 
§§ 1-7, 11-15), U/JemJ.1ed, Moorev. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway, 291 U.S. 205 (1934) (holding 
Federal Safety Appliance Act does not create an implied private right of action). 
151. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). 
152. [d. at 431. 
153. [d. at 432. 
154. See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970) (implying private right of action in 
Social Security Act of 1935, as amended in 1967); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 
544 (1969) (implying private right ofaction in Voting Rights Act of 1965); Wyandotte Co. v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967) (implying private right of action in Rivers and Harbors 
Act of 1899). 
155. See Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975) (finding no 
private right of action in Securities Investor Protection Act); National R.R. Passenger Corp. 
v. National Ass'n ofR.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974) (finding no private right ofaction 
under Rail Passenger Act of 1970); Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964) (finding no 
private right of action under Tide IV of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure 
Act of 1959); Stabile, supra note 147, at 866-67 nn.32, 34 (arguing courts were reluctant 
before 1975 to imply private rights of action, except perhaps in securities area). 
156. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
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from making contributions or expenditures in connection with 
presidential elections.157 However, more importantly for future 
decisioris, however, Con adopted a four factor test for deciding 
whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute: (1) is the plaintiff 
part of a class that the statute intends to provide special status to or 
benefits?; (2) is there implicit or explicit evidence that Congress 
intended to create or deny the proposed private right of action?; 
(3) is such a private right of action consistent with the underlying 
purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the 
plaintiff?; and (4) is the cause of action one traditionally relegated 
to state law and, thus, in an area where a federal cause of action 
would intrude on important state concerns?l58 The Court may have 
intended Con's four-part balancing test to reduce the number of 
cases in which courts inferred private causes of action, but the 
reverse occurred. In the four years after Con, twenty appellate 
decisions implied private actions from federal statutes.159 
B. Cannon v. University of Chicago: Recognizing a Private Right of 
Action Under Titles IX and VI 
In Cannon v. University of Chicago/ 60 the Supreme Court followed 
the lower courts' lead in using Con's approach to infer private 
remedies more liberally. Justice Scalia, a critic of judicially created 
implied rights of action, later observed that Cannon "exemplified" 
an "expansive rights-creating approach" to inferring private rights 
of action from regulatory statutes. 161 The Court inferred a private 
right of action for individuals to bring suit in federal courts against 
educational institutions receiving federal funds under section 
901 (a) of Title IX of the 1972 Education Act Amendments. 162 The 
plaintiff sued the defendant for violation of Title IX, which 
prohibits discrimination in educational institutions that receive 
federal funds. l63 Although the federal funding agency in Cannon, 
HEW, had established administrative procedures enabling 
individuals to file a complaint of discrimination and authorizing 
157. See id. at 68-69. 
158. See id. at 78; Stabile, supra note 147, at 867 n.38. 
159. See generally Cannon, 441 U.S. 677, 741-42 (Powell,]., dissenting). 
160. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
161. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 77 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
concuning) . 
162. 441 U.S. 677, 680 (1979). 
163. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-82. 
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the agency to tenninate funding to a recipient found guilty of 
discrimination, the Court established a private remedy, in part 
because HEW clearly supported the creation of a private right of 
action in light of its limited enforcement resources. l64 Mter 
examining Title IX's statutory language, its legislative history, its 
subject matter and its underlying purposes, the Court found that 
all four Cart factors favored the implication of a private right of 
action. l65 
Because Congress patterned Title IX after Title VI, including the 
use of virtually identical statutory language and the same 
procedures for tenninating funding, the Supreme Court in Cannon 
relied on prior interpretation of Title VI's language, legislative 
history, and regulations as major indications of Congress' intent to 
create a private right of action in Title IX. Hence, courts and 
commentators understand Cannon to create a private right of 
action under both statutes. l66 Justice Stevens' majority opinion first 
observed: "The drafters of Title IX explicitly assumed that it would 
be interpreted and applied as Title VI had been during the 
preceding eight years.,,167 He then noted that "[iJn 1972 when Title 
IX was enacted, the critical language in Title VI had already been 
construed as creating a private remedy."I68 The Court stated that it 
was appropriate to assume that Congress was aware of the 
numerous low~r federal court decisions interpreting Title VI as 
creating a private right of action when it enacted Title IX, and 
hence, that the legislature assumed that Title IX likewise created a 
private right of action. l69 In Guardians, Justice White observed, "it 
was the unmistakable thrust of the Cannon Court's opinion that the 
congressional view was correct as to the availability of private 
164. See Cannon, 441 U.S. 677,708 nn.41-42. 
165. Cannan, 441 U.S. 677, 709. 
166. See Cannon, 441 U.S. 677, 694-703; Neighborhood Action Coalition v. City of Canton, 
882 F.2d 1012, 1015 (6th Cir. 1989); Mabry v. State Bd. of Community Colleges & 
Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 317 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. den., 484 U.S. 849 (1987); 
Chowdbury v. Reading Hosp. & Medical Crr., 677 F.2d 317, 319 n.2 (3d Cir. 1982) 
("[C)ourts have consistently held the [Title IX] language of Cannan to be applicable in 
discussions of Title VI."); 118 Congo Rec. 5807 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh); Colopy, supra 
note 11, at 156-57 nn.140-41. 
167. Cannan, 441 U.S. 677, 696; see also United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1548 
(11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam), ecrt. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988); Fisher, supra note 8, at 318, 
329. 
168. Cannan, 441 U.S. 677, 696; Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 U.S. F.2d 847, 
852 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967). 
169. See Cannan, 441 U.S. 677, 696-703, 710-11. 
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actions to enforce Title VI.,,170 Accordingly, although Cannon did 
not explicitly hold that there was an implied right of action under 
Title VI, commentators and courts read Cannon as virtually 
inferring such a right under Title VI and Title IX.17I 
In Cannon, the Supreme Court observed that Title VI "sought to 
accomplish two related, but nevertheless somewhat different, 
objectives."I72 First, Congress sought to prevent the use of federal 
resources to support discriminatory practices; and, second, 
Congress wanted to protect individual citizens against 
discriminatory actions.173 Private litigation is not essential in 
serving the first purpose because potential plaintiffs may instead 
file an administrative complaint with the federal funding agency 
against the recipient. 174 However, if a recipient has been issued a 
one-time grant, the normal administrative deterrent of fund 
termination may not be effective in addressing the government's 
interest in punishing discriminatory recipients because the 
recipient may deplete all the awarded funds before the agency is 
able to terminate funding.J75 Accordingly, in one-grant cases, a 
private remedy could serve both to punish the violator and to deter 
other one-time grant recipients from engaging in discriminatory 
practices. 
Cannon provided additional reasons for inferring a private right 
of action under Title IX that are also applicable to Title VI. The 
Court found that Congress intended the statute to not only avoid 
the use of federal funds to support discriminatory programs, but 
170. Guardians, 463 U.S. 582, 594. 
171. See Cannon, 441 U.S. 677, 694-703; Neighborhood Action Coalition v. City of Canton, 
882 F.2d 1012, 1015 (6th Cir. 1989); Mabry v. State Bd. of Community Colleges & 
Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 317 (lOth Cir. 1987), cert. den., 484 U.S. 849 (1987); 
Chowdbury v. Reading Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 677 F.2d 317, 319 n.2 (3d Cir. 1982) 
("[C)ourts have consistendy held the [Tide IX) language of Cannon to be applicable in 
discussions of Tide VI."); 118 Congo Rec. 5807 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh); Colopy, supra 
note 11, at 156-57 nn.I40-41. Because Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, 
was also modeled on Tide VI and contains nearly identical language to both Tides VI and 
IX, most courts interpret Tide VI in light of Tide IX and Section 504'5 case law. See United 
States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 600 (1986) (section 504 
and its regulations were modeled after Tide VI; Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 
(1985) (section 504 was originally proposed as an amendment to Tide VI); Colopy, supra 
note 11, at 156-57 n.I40; but see Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 632-33 
n.13 (1984) (recognizing differences between Tide VI and Section 504). 
172. Cannon, 441 U.S. 677, 704. 
173. Cannon, 441 U.S. 677, 704. 
174. See Cannon, 441 U.S. 677,.704 n.37. 
175. See Cannon, 441 U.S. 677, 704 n.37. 
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also to "provide individual citizens effective protection against 
these practices.,,176 The Court concluded that only private remedies 
could secure the statute's interest in protecting individuals. The 
Court observed that a complainant could not participate in the 
administrative process.177 Moreover, the administrative process 
provided no assurance that a finding of violation would result in 
relief for the complainant. 178 Thus, the Court's reasoning implied 
that there should be a private cause of action under both Title VI 
and Title IX because both failed to provide direct remedies for 
complainants and allowed the funding agency only the indirect 
remedy of recipient fund termination. l79 Accordingly, the Court 
concluded that a private remedy was consistent with the underlying 
purposes of the legislative scheme and would not interfere with the 
agency's administrative enforcement process. ISO 
Cannon did not address the issue of whether there was also a 
private right of action under Title VI or Title IX's administrative 
regulations. Because Cannon was decided four years before the 
distinction created in Guardians between the discriminatory intent 
burden of proof pursuant to Section 601 of Title VI and the 
discriminatory effect burden of proof in Title VI's Section 602 
administrative regulations, it probably did not seem important to 
the Court in Cannon to discuss whether there was also a private 
right of action under Title VI or Title IX's administrative 
regulations. Normally, if a private right of action existed under 
Section 601, then it would make little difference whether there is 
also a right to sue under agency regulations issued pursuant to 
Section 602. However, Guardians' complex, hybrid and 
unconvincing distinction between the burden of proof of Section 
601 and Section 602 makes the issue of whether there is also a 
private right of action under Section 602 one of great 
• 181 Importance. 
176. Cannon, 441 U.S. 677, 704. 
177. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 677, 70f).()7 n.41. 
178. See Cannon, 441 U.S. 677 70f).()7 n.41. 
179. See Cannon, 441 U.S. 677, 707 n.41. 
180. See Cannon, 441 U.S. 677, 704-08. 
181. See supra notes 65-77 and accompanying text. 
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C. Justice Powell's Dissent in Cannon and the Court's New 
Emphasis on Legislative Intent 
In his dissenting opinion in Cannon, Justice Powell argues that 
the Court should abandon Cart's four-part test and instead focus 
exclusively on whether Congress intended to create a private 
remedy.l82 He maintains that "the Cart analysis too easily may be 
used to deflect inquiry away from the intent of Congress, and to 
permit a court instead to substitute its own views as to the 
desirability of private enforcement ... .',183 Justice Powell contends 
that it is too easy for judges to use Cart's other three factors to 
ignore legislative intent and engage in 'Judicial lawmaking."I84 
According to Justice Powell, "Cart allows the Judicial Branch to 
assume policymaking authority vested by the Constitution in the 
Legislative Branch."I85 In addition, judicial willingness to infer 
private causes of action despite statutory silence encourages 
Congress "to shirk its constitutional obligation and leave the issue 
to the courts to decide. ,,186 As a result of judicial lawmaking and 
congressional avoidance of controversial questions regarding 
whether a regulatory statute should be enforced through private 
litigation, "the public generally is denied the benefits that are 
derived from the making of important societal choices through the 
open debate of the democratic process." 
Although Justice Powell lost the battle in Cannon, his criticism of 
Cart led the Supreme Court to adopt a more restrictive application 
of the Cart standard for inferring a private right of action, which 
emphasized legislative intent much more than the other three 
factors. The Court also began to place the burden on the plaintiff 
to demonstrate that Congress intended to create a private right of 
action.187 In addition, the Court has increasingly required that the 
182. See generally Cannon, 441 U.S. 677, 730-49 (Powell,j., dissenting). 
183. See generally Cannon, 441 U.S. 677, 740 (Powell,j., dissenting). 
184. See generally Cannon, 441 U.S. 677, 740 (Powell,J., dissenting). 
185. See generally Cannon, 441 U.S. 677, 743 (Powell,j., dissenting). 
186. SeegeneraUy Cannon, 441 U.S. 677, 743 (Powell,J., dissenting). 
187. See, e.g., Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 178-80 (1994) (if statute 
does not explicidy create a private Ijght of action, Court examines how the Congress that 
passed the 1934 Exchange Act would have viewed the implication question); Suter v. Artist 
M., 503 U.S. 347, 363 (1992) (Con places the burden on plaintiff to demonstrate Congress' 
intent to make a private remedy available); Karahalios v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 
Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527, 532 (1989) (courts should focus on congressional intent in 
deciding whether to imply a private cause of action); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 
179 (1988) (four factors in Con are guides to congressional intent); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
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language and structure of a statute demonstrate that Congress 
intended to create a private remedy.l88 Thus, the Court has been 
less willing to rely on legislative history for evidence of legislative 
intent to establish a private right of action.l89 Hence, in 1992, 
Justice Scalia argued that Cannon s liberal approach for inferring a 
private right of action from a regulatory statute belonged to an 
"ancien regimi' no longer followed by the Court. loo However, 
because the Court in Cannon already recognized a private right of 
action for both Title VI and Title IX, the Court's more restrictive 
subsequent approach to inferring private remedies may not apply 
in deciding whether Title VI regulations create a private cause of 
action. 
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 377-78, 388 (1982) (implying private ight of 
action from Commodities Exchange Act, but stating 'there is no need ... to trudge through 
all four of the [Cort) factors when the dispositive question of legislative intent has been 
resolved') (quoting California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 302 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring in judgment»; Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers 
Assoc., 453 U.S. I, 15,25 (1981) (ultimate issue is congressional intent, but Cort factors are 
criteria through which to ascertain this intent); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 
(1981) (ultimate issue is congressional intent, but Cort factors are criteria through which to 
ascertain this intent); Universities Research Assoc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981) (Court 
considered three Cort factors, but as means to understand legislative intent); Transamerica 
Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 15-16 (1979) ("[W]hat must ultimately be 
determined is whether Congress intended to create the private remedy asserted"); Touche 
Ross & Co., v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568, 575 (1979) ("The ultimate question is one of 
congressional intent, not one of whether this Court thinks it can improve upon the statutory 
scheme that Congress enacted into law."); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979) (Con 
states the "criteria through which Congress's intent could be discerned."); Stabile, supra note 
147, at 868-71 (arguing Supreme Court beginning in 1979 began shifting away from four-
factor Cort test to "an exclusive reliance on legislative intent"). 
188. See, e.g., Karahalios v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1263,489 U.S. 527, 
533 (1989) (concluding "neither the language nor the structure of the Act shows any 
congressional intent to provide a private cause of action to enforce federal employees 
unions' duty of fair representation"); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea 
Clammers Assoc., 453 U.S. 1, 25 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment in part and 
dissenting in part) (arguing legislative history is unlikely to supply affirmative evidence of 
congressional intent to establish private remedies that the statute fails to mention). 
189. See, e.g., Karahalios v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527, 
533 (1989) (concluding "neither the language nor the structure of the Act shows any 
congressional intent to provide a private cause of action to enforce federal employees 
unions' duty of fair representation"); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea 
Clammers Assoc., 453 U.S. 1, 25 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment in part and 
dissenting in part) (arguing legislative history is unlikely to supply affirmative evidence of 
congressional intent to establish private remedies that the statute fails to mention). 
190. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 77-78 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
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D. Did Guardians Recognize a Private Right of Action Under Title 
VI Regulations? 
Despite the Court's more restrictive subsequent approach to 
inferring private remedies, the Court might defer to precedent if 
Guardians had established a private right of action pursuant to 
Section 602. There is a plausible argument that five members of 
the Guardians's Court implied that private litigants may state a 
claim of action for disparate impact discrimination under Title VI's 
implementing regulations.191 However, a majority of the 
Guardians's Court never explicitly held that such a private remedy 
exists. 
Although he did not directly rule on the scope of Section 602 
and its implementing regulations, Justice White argued in his 
Guardians opinion that a plaintiff should be able to present a 
discriminatory effect claim under Section 601.192 Accordingly, it is 
reasonable to infer from his approval of private rights of action 
under Section 601 for discriminatory effects challenges that Justice 
White would also allow private actions alleging discriminatory 
effects pursuant to Section 602 and its implementing regulations.193 
Furthennore, Justice White implied that the disparate impact 
regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor pursuant to 
section 602 were valid when he stated that he "believe[s] that the 
regulations are valid, even assuming arguendo that Title VI, in and 
of itself, does not proscribe disparate impact discrimination.,,194 
Justice Marshall argued in his Guardians dissent that private 
plaintiffs alleging discriminatory effects should be allowed to 
recover injunctive, declaratory or compensatory relief under 
Section 601.195 While he did not directly address private actions 
under Section 602, Justice Marshall's strong desire to use Title VI 
191. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925,930 (3d Cir. 
1997), vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.), 1998 WL 477242 (1998); infra notes 192-206 and 
accompanying text; see generally Guardians, 463 U.S. 582,584 n.2, 591-95 (White,]., delivering 
judgment of the Court); id. at 635-39 (Stevens,].,joined by Brennan & B1ackmun,jJ.); and 
id at 625-26,634 (Marshall,].). 
192. See Guardians, 463 U.S. 582,584,589-93; Chester Residents Concerned for Quality 
Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 930 (3d Cir. 1997), vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.), 1998 WL 477242 
(1998). 
193. See Guardians, 463 U.S. 582, 584, 589-93 (White,]., delivering judgment of the 
Court); Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 930 (3d Cir. 
1997), vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.), 1998 WL 477242 (1998). 
194. See Guardians, 463 U.S. 582, 584 n.2. 
195. Id. at 615, 625 (Marshall,]., dissenting) 
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to vindicate the rights of private individuals affected by disparate 
impacts suggests that he would have sought to use Section 602 to 
achieve this purpose. l96 
Justice Stevens' Guardians opinion, joined by Justices Brennan 
and Blackmun, did not distinguish between a private right of 
action and administrative remedies under Section 602, but his 
discussion of the remedies that should be available under Title VI 
implied that a private action should exist under the regulations. 
These three justices concluded that intentional discrimination is a 
necessary element under Section 601 of Title VI, but that 
regulations under Section 602 may incorporate a disparate impact 
standard. 197 Although Justice Stevens' opinion did not directly 
recognize a private right of action under agency regulations 
promulgated pursuant to Section 602, his argument that victims of 
disparate impact discrimination are entitled to all forms of relief 
(including presumably compensatory damages) only follows if 
there is a private cause of action under Section 602's implementing 
regulations. His words suggest that such a private right exists 
under the regulations. U[A]lthough petitioners had to prove that 
the respondents' actions were motivated by an invidious intent in 
order to prove a violation of [Title VI], they only had to show that 
the respondents' actions were producing discriminatory effects in 
order to prove a violation of [the regulations]."I98 
Accordingly, five members of the Court implicitly recognized a 
private right of action for disparate impacts under Title VI's 
implementing regulations. l99 However, because Guardians did not 
directly address whether a private right of action exists under Title 
VI's implementing regulations, the issue remains unresolved.200 
There is also an argument that Guardians implicitly recognized 
the existence of a private right of action for discriminatory effects 
claims under Section 602 and its implementing regulations 
196. Id. at 615. 625 (Marshall. J.. dissenting); Chester Residents Concerned for Quality 
Living v. Seif. 132 F.3d 925. 930 (3d Cir. 1997). vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.). 1998 WL 477242 
(1998). 
197. See Guardians, 463 U.S. 582, 641-45 (Stevens, Brennan & Blackmun.lJ., dissenting) 
198. See id. at 645 (Stevens, Brennan & Blackmun.lJ., dissenting). 
199. See Guardians. 463 U.S. 582, 584 n.2. 589-93; id. at 635-45 (Stevens. J.. joined by 
Brennan & Blackmun, lJ.); id at 615. 623-26. 634 (Marshall. J.); Chester Residents 
Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 930 (3d Cir. 1997). vacated, No. 97-1620 
(U.S.). 1998 WL 477242 (1998). 
200. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925. 930 (3d Cir. 
1997). vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.). 1998 WL 477242 (l9~8). 
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because the Court did not dismiss the plaintiffs' action sua sponte 
for failure to state a claim.201 The district court in Guardians relied 
on the Department of Labor's Title VI regulations202 in holding 
that proof of discriminatory effect was sufficient to establish a 
violation of Title VI.203 The district court, appellate court, and 
Supreme Court all agreed that the discrimination in the case was 
unintentional.204 Thus, one could argue that the Supreme Court 
should have dismissed the action sua sponte if there was no 
possibility of basing a suit on discriminatory effects under Section 
602 and its implementing regulations. However, none of the 
parties in Guardians raised an objection under Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or otherwise raised the issue of 
whether a private right of action exists under Section 602 and its 
implementing regulations.205 The Guardians' Court did not clearly 
address the issue of whether a private right of action exists 
pursuant to Section 602 and its implementing regulations.206 
In Alexander, the Supreme Court suggested that Guardians 
created an implied private right of action for disparate impacts 
under Title VI's implementing regulations: 
Guardians, therefore, does not support petitioners' blanket 
proposluon that federal law proscribes only intentional 
discrimination against the handicapped. Indeed, to the extent OUT 
holding in Guardians is relevant to the interpretation of § 504, 
Guardians suggests that the regulations implementing § 504, upon 
which respondents in part rel~ could make actionable the disparate 
impact challenged in this case. 7 
. However, Alexander never explicitly held that there was an 
implied private right of action for disparate impacts under Title 
VI's Section 602 implementing regulations.208 
By frequently citing to Guardians and Alexander, a number of 
federal circuit courts imply that Title VI's Section 602 
discriminatory effects regulations can be enforced by a private right 
201. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 930 (3d Cir. 
1997), vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.), 1998 WL 477242 (1998). 
202. See 29 C.F.R § 31.3(c)(I). 
203. See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 582; ill. 466 F. Supp. 1273, 1285-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
204. See generally Guardians, 463 U.S. at 582-89. 
205. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 930 (3d Cir. 
1997), vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.), 1998 WL 477242 (1998). 
206. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 930 (3d Cir. 
1997), vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.), 1998 WL 477242 (1998). . 
207. 469 U.S. 287, 294 (footnote omitted). 
208. See supra notes 70-74, 207 and accompanying text. 
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of action.209 However, until the Third Circuit's decision in Chester, 
circuit courts failed to undertake an inquiry into whether the 
existence of a private right of action under Section 601 of the 
statute necessarily provided a persuasive argument for implying the 
same remedies under Section 602 regulations. Chester properly 
concluded that Section 602 creates a private right of action. Yet, its 
analysis of whether Congress intended to allow private suits is not 
fully convincing. 
209. See, e.g., Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481, 486 (10 Cir. 1996) (citing Guardians, court 
found a private right of action under Title VI's implementing regulations and stated that, 
"[a]1though Title VI itself proscribes only intentional discrimination, certain regulations 
promulgated pursuant to Title VI prohibit actions that have a disparate impact on groups 
protected by the act, even in the absence of discriminatory intent"); New York Urban 
League v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Guardians and Alexander and 
permitting plaintiffs to assert a disparate impact claim under Title VI's implementing 
regulations); City of Chicago v. Lindley, 66 F.3d 819, 827-29 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing 
Guardians and Alexander, court acknowledged a private right of action for disparate impact 
discrimination under Title VI's implementing regulations); Elston v. Talladega County Bd. 
of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1406-07 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Guardians and Alexander, the court 
held the district court properly applied a disparate impact analysis to actions challenged 
under the Department of Education's Title VI regulations); David K. v. Lane, 839 F.2d 1265, 
1274 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding plaintiffs could bring private right of action under Title VI's 
implementing regulations, and, citing Guardians, stating that evidence of disparate impact 
discrimination is enough to prevail on claim based on regulations); Georgia State 
Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (lIth Cir. 1985) (citing 
Guardians, court concluded that five members of Supreme Court "were of the opinion that 
the regulations promulgated under Title VI permit the filing of suits alleging a disparate 
impact theory"); United States v. Lulac, 793 F.2d 636, 648 n.34 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing 
Guardians and recognizing plaintiffs may seek equitable relief for disparate impact claim 
under both Title VI and its implementing regulations); Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969,981-82 
(9th Cir. 1984) (citing Guardians, holding proof of discriminatory effect suffices to establish 
liability when the suit is brought to enforce regulations issued pursuant to the statute rather 
than the statute itselO; see also Buchanan v. City of Bolivar, 99 F.3d 1352, 1356 n.5 (6th Cir. 
1995) (in suit for intentional discrimination under Title VI, the court, citing Guardians, 
assumed in dictum that private party could file suit under Title VI for a disparate impact 
claim); Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 564 n.9 (11th Cir. 1996); Latinos Unidos de Chelsea en 
Accion v. Secretary of HUD, 799 F.2d 774, 785 n.20 (1st Cir. 1986) (stating "[u]nder the 
statute itself, plaintiffs must make a showing of discriminatory intent; under the regulations, 
plaintiffs simply must show a discriminatory impact"); Castaneda and Castaneda v. Pickard, 
781 F.2d 456, 466 (5th Cir. 1986) (suggesting plaintiffs could bring private right of action 
under Title VI's implementing regulations for disparate impact claim); Roberts v. Colorado 
State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832 (10th Cir.) (in Title IX case, court stated in dicta that 
Guardians permits plaintiffs to assert a disparate impact claim under Title IX's implementing 
regulations), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993); Pfeiffer v. Marion Center School Dist., 917 
F.2d 779, 788 (3d Cir. 1990) (In Title IX case, court suggested in dicta that Guardians 
indicated that under Title VI "proof of discriminatory effect suffices to establish liability 
when suit is brought to enforce the regulations rather than the statute itself."); if. Cohen v. 
Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 173 (1st Cir. 1996) (deciding private suit alleging gender 
disparities based on Title IX regulations). 
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VII. CHESTER REsIDENTS CONCERNED FOR QUALITY LIvING V. SElF 
A. The District Court 
In Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seij,210 the 
plaintiffs, residents of Chester and members of Chester Residents 
Concerned for Quality Living (CRCQL), alleged that the 
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection's (PADEP) 
approval of a permit to allow Soil Remediation Services, a private 
company, to build a waste treatment facility in an area that already 
had several solid waste processing plants placed a disparate burden 
on the predominantly Mrican-American population in Chester 
Township.211 Additionally, in its response brief, CRCQL alleged 
that PADEP's approval of five waste facility permits in the Township 
from 1987 to 1996 demonstrated discriminatory intent.212 The 
district court recognized a private right of action under Title VI.213 
However, the court conclud,ed that the plaintiffs' allegations in its 
complaint alleged only that the defendant's actions caused 
discriminatory effects and, thus, did not meet the standard of proof 
in Section 601, which is intentional discrimination.214 
Additionally, the district court held that there is no private right 
of action under the EPA's Section 602 regulations.215 It found that 
the Supreme Court had never decided whether a private right of 
action existed under Title VI's Section 602 regulations.216 The 
court interpreted a prior Third Circuit decision, holding that a 
plaintiff need not exhaust her administrative remedies under 
Section 602 before filing a private suit under Section 601, to imply 
that there was no private right of action under Section 602.217 The 
District Court suggested that Section 602's sole purpose was to 
210. 944 F. Supp. 413 (E.D. Pa. 1996), rev'd 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 
22,67 U.S.L.W. 3155, (U.S. Aug. 17, 1998) (No. 97-1620). 
211. The plaintiffs alleged that 53.6 percent of the population in Chester Township was 
black. [d. at 414-15 & n.1. 
212. [d. at 415. Only two permits were granted in other areas of Delaware County. [d. 
The two permits granted in predominantly white areas were for small facilities that each had 
a capacity of 700 tons per year, but the five permits granted in predominantly African-
American areas had a total waste capacity of over 2,000,000 tons per year. [d. 
213. [d. at 416-17. 
214. [d. at 417. 
215. [d. at 417. 
216. [d.at417n.5. 
217. [d. at 417 & n.5 (citing Chowdhury v. Reading Hospital & Medical Center, 677 F.2d 
317 (3d Cir. 1982), ccrt. denied, 463 U.S. 1229 (1983». 
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create an administrative enforcement scheme that did not provide 
for any individual remedies or rights ofparticipation.218 
B. The Third Circuit 
The Third Circuit reversed the District Court and held that the 
EPA's Title VI regulations create a private right of action.219 The 
court applied a three-factor test to determine the existence of a 
private right of action under Section 602: (i), whether the agency 
rule is properly within the scope of the enabling statute; (ii), 
whether the enabling statute intended to create a private right of 
action; and (iii), whether the implication of a private right of 
action under the regulation will further the purpose of the 
enabling statute.220 The EPA's regulations clearly met the first test 
and there are strong arguments that a private right of action 
advance Title VI's purposes, which satisfies the third factor. 
However, the Third Circuit's argument concerning the second 
factor, congressional intent is open to criticism in light of recent 
Supreme Court decisions regarding the amount of evidence that 
must be present to show that Congress intended to create a private 
right of action.221 
Applying the same three-factor test,222 this Article provides a 
stronger argument than the Third Circuit's for concluding that the 
EPA's regulations under Section 602 of Title VI create an implied 
private right of action. Essentially, it would be inconsistent to apply 
today's more stringent standard for inferring congressional intent 
in deciding whether a private right exists under Section 602, in 
light of the Supreme Court's application of a more lenient 
standard in recognizing a right under Section 601. Accordingly, 
courts should infer that there is an implied private right of action 
under Section 602 and its implementing regulations. 
1. The Three-Factor Test 
Cart's four factor test, utilized to determine if an implied private 
right of action exists under a statute, only partially addressed the 
issues raised by the question of whether to infer a private right of 
218. Id. at 417. 
219. 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997), vacated 119 S: Ct. 22,67 U.S.L.W. 3155, (U.S. Aug. 17, 
1998) (No. 97-1620). 
220. See infra notes 224-27 and accompanying text. 
221. See infra notes 255-270 and accompanying text. 
222. See infra notes 316-337 and accompanying text. 
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action to enforce regulations.223 Chester's three-part test 
supplements Core's four-part standard: (i) whether the agency rule 
is properly within the scope of the enabling statute; (ii) whether 
the enabling statute intended to create a private right of action; 
and (iii) whether the implication of a private right of action under 
the regulation will further the purpose of the enabling statute.224 
Under the third prong of the test, it is not necessary to examine 
"congressional intent" because a court under the second prong 
must have already examined whether Congress intended the 
statute to give rise to private actions.225 In addition, the court does 
not need to examine the agency's intent in promulgating the rule. 
If the rule is valid, if it advances the statute's substantive purposes, 
and if the statute provides a private right of action as a matter of 
congressional intent, a court will infer that the regulation creates a 
private right of action regardless of the agency's intent.226 Thus, 
under this third prong, "if the rule is reasonably related to the 
substantive purposes of its enabling statute, we will find that the 
regulation 'was drafted such that a private action may be 
legitimately implied. ,,,227 
2. The Supreme Court Has Clearly Recognized a Private Right 
of Action Under the Statute 
The EPA's Title VI regulations clearly meet the first test because 
Section 602 of the statute clearly gives agencies the authority to 
promulgate regulations.228 In Guardians229 , a majority of the Court 
223. See Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec, Inc. 764 F.2d 939, 947 (3d Cir. 1985), cerI. 
denied, 474 U.S. 935 (1985). 
224. See Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987, 994 (3d Cir. 1988) (applying three-part 
test); Angelastro, 764 F.2d at 94748 (using two-fold inquiry that incorporates three factors); 
see also Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 536-37 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(applying two-part test that incorporates three factors); Association of Mexican-American 
Educators v. California, 836 F.Supp. 1534, 1546-48 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (applying two-part test 
that incorporates three factors), appeal pending, No. 96-17131 (9th Cir.); Gilbert Paul 
Carrasco, Public Wrong:5, Private Rights: Private Attorneys General for Civil Rights, 9 ViII. Envtl. 
LJ. 321,329-39 (1998) (discussing tests for implying private rights of action in the Third, 
Fifth and Ninth Circuits, and arguing Ninth Circuit test is most appropriate). 
225. See Angelastro, 764 F.2d 939, at 947; Rnbertson, 749 F.2d 530, at 536. 
226. See Rnbertson, 749 F.2d 530, at 536; Association of Mexican-American Educators, 836 
F.Supp. 1534, at 1547. 
227. Rnbertson, 749 F.2d 530, at 537 (quotingJablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 
679 (9th Cir. 1980); accord Angelastro, 764 F.2d 939, at 947. 
228. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l; Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 
F.3d 925, 933 (3d Cir. 1997), vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.), 1998 WL 477242 (1998); supra 
notes 52-54, 67-74 and accompanying text. 
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held that Title VI pennits federal agencies to promulgate 
regulations that prohibit disparate impact discrimination (at least 
where the agency had consistently done so in the past).230 
Guardians' historical test clearly applies to the EPA's Title VI 
regulations, which have consistently embraced a discriminatory 
effects test.2S1 
3. Congressional Intent to Create a Private Right 
A much more difficult issue is whether Congress intended to 
authorize a private right of action under Section 602 of Title VI. In 
addressing this second prong, Cart's four factor test (as interpreted 
by subsequent decisions) applies.232 The two Cart factors that are 
relevant under the second prong include whether: (1) there is "any 
indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create 
such a remedy or to deny one"; and (2) such a private cause of 
action is "consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative 
scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff."m 
a. Explicit or Implicit Indications of Congressional Intent 
The Third Circuit found "some indication" in the legislative 
history of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987234 of 
congressional intent to create a private right of action under 
Section 602 and its implementing regulations "in satisfaction of the 
Cart factors.,,235 The Third Circuit rejected PADEP's argument that 
the legislative history of the 1987 amendments was not relevant or 
binding.236 
229. 463 u.s. 582 (1983). 
230. See Guardians, 463 U.S. 582, 584; id. at 64245 (Stevens, j. joined by Brennan & 
Blackmun, lJ.); id at 623 (Marshall, j.); accurd Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293-94 
(1985); see also Lazarus, supra note 5, at 835; Colopy, supra note 11, at 159. 
231. See 40 C.F.R § 7.35 (1991); Lazarus, supra note 5, at 835. 
232. See AngeWstro, 764 F.2d 939, at 947. 
233. Curt, 422 U.S. 66, at 78 (citing National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of 
Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974»; see Chester Residents Concerned for Quality 
Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 933 (3d Cir. 1997) (discussing two Gmt factors relevant under 
second prong of three-part test for inferring private right of action under agency 
regulations), vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.), 1998 WL 477242 (1998). 
234. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988); 
infra notes 238, 243-252 and accompanying text. 
235. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 934 (3d Cir. 
1997), vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.), 1998 WL 477242 (1998); see also EPA Amicus Brief, supra 
note 79, at 19-23. 
236. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 934-35 (3d 
Cir. 1997), vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.), 1998 WL 477242 (1998). 
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i. Evidence in 1987 Act Supporting a Private Right of 
Action 
In an amicus brief,237 the United States argued that the 
implication of a private right of action under Section 602 and its 
implementing regulations is consistent with legislative intent 
because Congress acknowledged the existence of such a right when 
it amended Title VI in enacting the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 
1987.238 The 1987 Act made several indirect references to private 
rights of action. First, in a House Report on an early version of the 
bill, the report stated that the "private right of action which allows 
a private individual or entity to provide the vehicle to test [certain] 
regulations in Title IX and their expanded meaning to their 
outermost limits.,,239 Second, several legislators, including both 
supporters and opponents of the amendments, explicitly 
recognized a private right of action based on violations of either 
Title VI or Title IX regulations.240 Third, several witnesses at the 
hearings (from both sides of the debate) discussed the existence of 
Title VI disparate impact regulations and stated that private parties 
could enforce those standards by suing in federal court. 241 
Furthermore, a memorandum by the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) stated that in OMB's view "every licensed attorney 
would be empowered to file suit to enforce the 'effects test' 
237. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 933-34 (3d Cir. 
1997), vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.), 1998 WL 477242 (1998). 
238. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a) (overruling Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 
(1984»; Fisher, supra note 8, at 318; Sonn, supra note 10, at 1590-91. 
239. H.R. REP. No. 963, Pt. I, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1986) (observing that private right 
of action exists to enforce Title IX regulations). 
240. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 963, Pt. I, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1986) (observing that 
private right of action exists under both Title IX and its regulations); 134 Cong Rec. 4,257 
(1988) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (predicting advocacy groups will file Title VI disparate 
impact suits in federal court); see also id. at 99-100 (1988) (statement of Sen. Hatch) 
(discussing enforcement of disparate impact suits by private parties); 130 Cong Rec. 18,879-
80 (1984) (statement of Rep. Field) (considering Guardians and contending that "a State 
[will] be subject to private lawsuits because the tests have a disproportionate impact on 
minorities"); Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 934 n.13 
(3d Cir. 1997), vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.), 1998 WL 477242 (1998). 
241. See Civil Rights Act of 1984: Hearings on S. 2568 Before the Subcomm. on the Const. 
of the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-34, 153-54, 200 (1984); Civil 
Rights Restoration Act of 1985: joint Hearings on H.R. 700 Before the House Comm. on 
Educ. & Labor and the Subcomm. on Civil & Const. Rights of the House Comm. on the 
judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 734, 1095, 1099 (1985); Chester Residents Concerned for 
Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925,934 n.13 (3d Cir. 1997), vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.), 
1998 WL 477242 (1998). 
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regulations of agencies, challenging practices in every aspect of 
every institution that receives any Federal assistance.,,242 
ll. The 1987 Act Had a Different Purpose 
Unfortunately, the purpose of the 1987 Act was to repudiate 
Grove City College v. Bell, 243 a 1984 Supreme Court decision that 
applied the intended beneficiary doctrine to Title IX of the Civil 
Rights Act by holding that federal funds received by a subunit of an 
educational institution did not subject the entire institution to the 
non-discriminatory demands of the statute. 244 Under Grove City's 
intended beneficiary test, if a subunit did not receive federal funds, 
then the presumption was that participants in its activities were not 
the intended beneficiaries of the federal aid at issue.245 Grove City 
essentially restricted standing in Title VI cases to intended 
beneficiaries for two reasons:246 (1) the language of Title IX was 
expressly modeled after Title VI; and (2) the Supreme Court had 
frequently relied on the constructions of one in interpreting the 
other.247 
The 1987 Act rejected Grove City by broadly defining the term 
"institution-wide basis,,248 to include "all of the operations,,249 of the 
recipient. Thus, pursuant to the 1987 Act, if a state or local 
government agency program receives any federal assistance, Title 
VI governs the entire agency.250 
Hence, the purpose of the 1987 Act was to address the Supreme 
242. Civil Rights Act of 1984: Hearings on S. 2568 Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of 
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 527 (1984). 
243. 465 U.S. 555 (1984). 
244. See id. at 573. 
245. See Fisher, supra note 8, at 318. 
246. See United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). 
247. See supra notes 166-171 and accompanying text. 
248. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, § 2(2), 20 U.S.C. § 1687(2)(A); Fisher, supra 
note 8, at 318 n.169. 
249. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, § 6,42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a; Fisher, supra note 
8, at 318 n.170. 
250. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a (overruling Grove City 
College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984»; United States v. Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. 642, 652 (E.D. 
La. 1988); Fisher, supra note 8, at 317-318; Colopy, supra note 11, at 154-55 n. 130, 175 nn. 
235-37; Sonn, supra note 10, at 159~91. In addition, a federally-funded recipient may be 
responsible in some circumstances for the discriminatory behavior of entities indirectly 
benefiting from the recipient. See United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of 
Am., 477 U.S. 597, 618 (1986) (Marshall,]., dissenting); Colopy, supra note 11, at 175 n. 237. 
A private airline, however, is not covered even if it operates at an airport that receives 
federal funding. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. at 606-607. 
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Court's decision in Grove City, not to ratify or create a private right 
of action under Section 602 and its implementing regulations. The 
official history of the Act explains that its amendments directly 
"address[] only the scope of coverage under Title VI, Title IX, 
section 504, and the Age Discrimination Act of recipients of federal 
financial assistance."251 Furthermore, the official history warns that 
statements of individual members of Congress "made during 
consideration of the earlier versions of this legislation in the 98th 
and 99th Congresses, as well as the current versions, merely reflect 
the views of individual members of Congress. Such statements are 
not relevant to the interpretation of S. 557.,,252 Accordingly, there 
is a strong argument that statements in the legislative history of the 
1987 Civil Rights Restoration Act that support a private right of 
action under Title VI's Section 602 implementing regulations are 
not binding. 
iii. The Third Circuit Holds the 1987 Act Provides 
Sufficient Evidence 
In Chester, the Third Circuit rejected the argument that the 
legislative history of the 1987 amendments was not relevant or 
binding.253 The court emphasized that the Pennsylvania 
Department of Environmental Protection failed to "cite to any 
statements in the Congressional Record or elsewhere that would 
undermine those cited by the United States." Therefore, the court 
argued that the legislative history of the 1987 Civil Rights 
Restoration Act provided "some inditation" and "uncontroverted" 
evidence of the relevant congressional intent necessary to imply a 
private right of action under the Title VI implementing regulations 
"in satisfaction of the Corlj"aCtors. "254 
iv. The Third Circuit's Decision Fails to Meet the 
Supreme Court's Test for Legislative Intent 
The Third Circuit's reliance on the 1987 Act to establish a 
private right of action under Section 602 does not meet the 
Supreme Court's current standard for inferring congressional 
251. S. Rep. No. 100-64, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.CAN. 3, 
30. 
252. 1988 U.S.C.CAN. at 32. 
253. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 934-35 (3d 
Cir. 1997), vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.), 1998 WL 477242 (1998). 
254. [d. 
44 COLUMBIAjOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAw [Vol. 24:1 
intent.255 Several Supreme Court decisions suggest that a private 
right of action may be implied by courts only if the original 
Congress enacting a statute intended to create a private right, or a 
subsequent Congress explicitly amended the statute to do SO.256 In 
Suter v. Artist M., the Supreme Court interpreted Cart to place the 
burden on the plaintiff to demonstrate Congress' intent to make a 
private remedy available.257 II;! Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 
the Court indicated that if a statute did not explicitly create a 
private right of action, then courts should examine whether the 
Congress that passed the original statute would have viewed the 
implication question.258 
Additionally, courts and commentators treat subsequent 
legislative history as the least reliable form of legislative history.259 
There are formalist arguments that a later Congress may not use 
legislative history to explain the meaning of a prior statute because 
it is a separate decisionmaking body, which has no constitutional 
role in explaining or interpreting that which a prior body has 
enacted.260 Some also contend that once Congress has acted, only 
the judiciary may interpret the meaning of law.261 There are also 
pragmatic concerns about how reliable subsequent congressional 
255. See Suter v. Artist M., 503 u.s. 347, 363 (1992) (Cart places the burden on plaintifIto 
demonstrate Congress' intent to make a private remedy available); Stabile, supra note 147, at 
868-71 (arguing Supreme Court beginning in 1979 began shifting away from four-factor Cart 
test to "an exclusive reliance on legislative intent."); supra 187-190, 256-258 and infra notes 
265-270 and accompanying text. 
256. See, e.g. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 178-80 (1994) (if statute 
does not explicitly create a private right of action, court examines whether Congress that 
passed the 1934 Exchange Act would have viewed the implication question); Suter v. Artist 
M., 503 U.S. 347, 363 (1992) (Cmtplaces the burden on plaintifIto demonstrate Congress' 
intent to make a private remedy available); Karahalios v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 
Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527, 532-533 (1989) (courts should focus on congressional intent in 
deciding whether to imply a private cause of action); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 
179 (1988) (four factors in Cart are guides to congressional intent); supra 187-190 and infra 
notes 257-58, 265-270 and accompanying text. 
257. See 503 U.S. 347, 363 (1992). 
258.511 U.S. 164,178-80 (1994). 
259. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm. v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 117-18 (1980) 
(citing United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960»; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 222 (1994); James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on 
Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter or TeUing Response, 93 MICH. L. REv. I, 61-66 
(1994); William N. Eskridge, Post-Enactment Legislative Signals, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Winter, 1994, at 75, 79; Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory Interpretation 
PnrEnvironmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agmcy Decisionmaking Is Better Than Judicial Literalism, 53 
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1231, 1274 (1996). 
260. See Brudney, supra note 259, at 61. 
261. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566 (1988); Brudney, supra note 259, at 61. 
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commentary may be in ascertaining the intent of the enacting 
I . I 262 egts ature. 
During recent years, the Supreme Court has become increasingly 
reluctant to consider post-enactment legislative history.263 For 
instance, the Supreme Court in Public Empluyees Retirement System of 
Ohio v. Betts declared that "[w]e have observed on more than one 
occasion that the interpretation given by one Congress (or a 
committee or member thereof) to an earlier statute is of little 
assistance in discerning the meaning of that statute.,,264 
However, if a subsequent statute clearly recognizes a private right 
of action or explicitly approves judicial decisions implying such a 
private remedy, then the Supreme Court will acknowledge that a 
private right of action exists under the statute. Justice Scalia has 
suggested that the Court should never imply a right of action if a 
statute does not contain such a remedy and, thus, that Cannon 
improperly inferred a right of action under Title IX.265 Because 
1986 amendments to Title IX explicitly waived state's sovereign 
immunity to remedies both at law and equity, even Justice Scalia 
concedes that this subsequent legislation validated the Cannon 
Court's creation of private rights of action under Title IX.266 
In deciding whether to imply a private right of action, "what must 
ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended to create 
the private remedy asserted.,,267 In discerning this intent, the 
Supreme Court examines the statute's text (and possibly its 
legislative history) to determine whether the enacting legislature 
intended to create a private right of action. It rarely considers what 
subsequent legislatures might believe is the statute's intent or 
pu.rpose.268 The Supreme Court has become increasingly unwilling 
262. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552,566-67 (1988); Brudney, supra note 259, at 62-
63. 
263. See Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825, 838-40 (1988) 
(extensive discussion); Eskridge, supra note 259, at 83-85 (arguing Rehnquist Court has been 
more hostile to post-enactment legislative history than Burger Coun); but see Franklin v. 
Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (accepting congressional adoption, or 
acquiescence, by silence). 
264. 492 U.S. 158, 168 (1989). 
265. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 50, 77-78 (1992) (Scalia, j., 
concurring in judgment). 
266. See Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986,42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a) (1), (2); Franklin 
v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 50, 78 (1992) (Scalia,J., concurring injudgment). 
267. Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. at 364 (quoting Transamerica Mongage Advisers, Inc. v. 
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11,15-16 (1979». 
268. See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164,178-80 (1994) (ifstatute does 
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to defer to subsequent legislative signals of approval or to 
acquiesce to judicial decisions approving an implied cause of 
action. Instead, the Court examines the statute to ascertain the 
enacting legislature's intent.269 
In 1964, when it enacted Title VI, Congress probably never 
considered whether it wished to establish a private right to sue 
under Section 602 or under Section 601. Subsequent Congresses 
have not resolved the issue; there have been no explicit 
amendments to Section 602 to allow private suits. Hence, evidence 
in the 1987 Act that some members of Congress acquiesced in the 
creation of a private right of action under Section 602 cannot 
sustain a plaintiffs burden of demonstrating congressional intent 
under Suter or Central Bank because the 1987 Act was not directly 
concerned with that issue. The legislative history of the 1987 Act is 
only persuasive evidence of such congressional intent if a court 
applies the less demanding standard for implying private rights of 
action in Cannon rather than the standard found in more recent 
270 
cases. 
It is possible that the Third Circuit deliberately avoided 
addressing recent cases applying a restrictive reading of Cart 
because the Court was eager to recognize a private right to sue 
under Section 602. The Third Circuit could ignore Suter or Central 
Bank because Cart remains good law despite the Supreme Court's 
more restrictive interpretation of the four-factor test in recent 
not explicitly create a private right of action, coun examines whether Congress that passed 
the Exchange Act would have viewed the implication question); See generally Suter v. Artist 
M., 503 U.S. 347, 363 (1992) (Con places the burden on plaintiff to demonstrate Congress' 
intent to make a private remedy available); Karahalios v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 
Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527, 533-34 (1989) (concluding "neither the language nor the 
structure of the Act shows any congressional intent to provide a private cause of action to 
enforce federal ·employees unions' duty of fair representation."); Middlesex County 
Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Assoc., 453 U.S. I, 25 (1981) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing legislative history is unlikely 
to supply affirmative evidence of congressional intent to establish private remedies that the 
statute fails to mention). 
269. See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 185-87 (1994) (rejecting 
argument that Congress's amendments to the securities laws subsequent to coun decisions 
recognizing an implied private right of action without saying that such an action was not 
available are evidence that Congress has acquiesced in the judicialinterpretation); Stabile, 
supra note 147, at 892; see generally Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.l 
(1989) (arguing courts generally should not place "undue reliance on the concept of 
congressional ratification"); Eskridge, supra note 259, at 84 (Supreme Coun has become 
increasingly unwilling to defer to subsequent legislative signals of approval or acquiescence 
to judicial decisions). 
270. See supra notes 187·190, 255-258, 265-269 and accompanying text. 
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years. Because the Supreme Court grants certiorari in only a small 
percentage of cases, federal circuit courts have some discretion in 
how they broadly or narrowly they interpret the Court's decisions 
as long as they do not openly flout precedent. 
b. A Private Cause of Action Is Consistent With the 
Legislative Scheme of Section 602 and the EPA's 
Administrative Scheme 
The Third Circuit concluded that a private right of action under 
Section 602 is consistent with the EPA's administrative process.271 
The court rejected PADEP's argument that creating a private right 
of action would interfere with the EPA's administrative complaint 
process and funding termination procedures.272 
PADEP argued that Section 602 requires that the EPA act as a 
gatekeeper to enforcement because the provision requires the 
funding agency to file an investigative report and to negotiate with 
the recipient before terminating funding.273 Thus, PADEP 
contended it would be inconsistent with the legislative scheme to 
allow a private suit under Section 602 to commence before the 
agency had the opportunity to conduct an investigation and 
negotiations.274 Conversely, the United States in its amicus brief 
maintained that its Title VI regulations do not preclude a private 
right of action, will not interfere with the agency's enforcement 
program, and that the remedy will advance the statute's purposes 
in light of the agency's limited resources.275 
The Third Circuit concluded that a private lawsuit is not 
inconsistent with the legislative scheme in Section 602 because a 
suit provides the recipient with notice similar to that of the filing of 
an administrative complaint.276 Additionally, the court may not 
award relief without conducting an extensive trial that achieves 
many of the same goals as an administrative investigation. 
271. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 934-36 (3d 
Cir. 1997), vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.), 1998 WL 477242 (1998); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1. 
272. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 934-35 (3d 
Cir. 1997), vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.), 1998 WL 477242 (1998); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1. 
273. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 934-35 (3d 
Cir. 1997), vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.), 1998 WL 477242 (1998); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1. 
274. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 934-35 (3d 
Cir. 1997), vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.), 1998 WL 477242 (1998); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1. 
275. See EPA Amicus Brief, supra note 79, at 12-13. 
276. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 935-36 (3d 
Cir. 1997), vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.), 1998 WL 477242 (1998). 
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Accordingly, a private suit is not inconsistent with the notice and 
investigatory requirements in Section 602.277 Furthermore, even if 
a lawsuit does not provide the same notice and investigatory 
protections as the administrative process established by Section 602 
and its implementing regulations, the purpose those procedural 
requirements serve is not as significant in private lawsuits where the 
remedy does not include the authority to terminate funding.278 
Additionally, a private right of action under the EPA's Title VI 
regulations would not interfere with the agency's enforcement of 
its administrative sanctions because a private party may not request 
that a court terminate funding to a discriminatory recipient.2'79 
Hence, a private suit would not interfere with a federal agency's 
decision to terminate funding to a discriminatory recipient.280 
Accordingly, the implication of private rights of action under 
Section 602 and its implementing regulations is consistent with the 
administrative processes authorized by Section 602's legislative 
scheme.281 
4. A Private Right of Action Advances Title VI's Dual Purposes 
Under the third prong, the Third Circuit agreed with the United 
States that creating a private right of action under Section 602 
would advance the statute's dual purposes of: (1) preventing 
discriminatory uses of federal funds and (2) protecting individual 
rights.282 The United States in its amicus brief argued that the court 
should recognize a private right of action to enforce Section 602 
and its implementing regulations because the government lacked 
the resources to achieve adequate enforcement of the EPA's 
regulations.283 Additionally, a private right of action is essential in 
277. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 935-36 (3d 
Cir. 1997), vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.), 1998 WL 477242 (1998). 
278. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 935-36 (3d Cir. 
1997), vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.), 1998 WL 477242 (1998). 
279. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 935-36 (3d 
Cir. 1997), vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.), 1998 WL 477242 (1998). 
280. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 935-36 (3d 
Cir. 1997), vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.), 1998 WL 477242 (1998). 
281. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 935-36 (3d 
Cir. 1997), vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.), 1998 WL 477242 (1998). 
282. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 936 (3d Gir. 
1997), vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.), 1998 WL 477242 (1998). 
283. See EPA Amicus Brief, supra note 79, at 12-13; Chester Residents Concerned for 
Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925,936 (3d Cir. 1997), vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.), 1998 WL 
477242 (1998). 
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protecting individual rights because of the limitations of the EPA's 
administrative enforcement mechanisms (Le., enforcement 
mechanisms which allow only for funding terminations as a remedy 
and do not guarantee a complainant the right to participate in the 
administrative process).284 Cannon emphasized that a private right 
of action would advance both purposes by deputizing private 
attorneys general to enforce either Tide IX or Tide VI.285 Hence, 
the Third Circuit found that a private right of action under Section 
602 would advance Tide VI's dual purposes.286 
5. Fordice Does Not Bar Private Rights of Action 
PADEP also argued that the Court's opinion in United States v. 
Fordice287 precluded a private right of action under Section 602.288 
In a footnote, Fordice stated that "the reach of Tide VI's protection 
extends no further than the Fourteenth Amendment.,,289 Because 
the Fourteenth Amendment requires proof of intentional 
discrimination standard, PADEP suggested that the EPA's disparate 
impact regulations are invalid, and thus, CRCQL could not file suit 
based on them.290 However, the Third Circuit observed that Fordice 
did not bar suits based on proof of discriminatory intent.291 Rather, 
"the Court merely noted that the affirmative relief called for under 
the statute could not reach beyond that afforded by the 
Constitution itself."292 Furthermore, the Third Circuit 
acknowledged that Fordice's footnote could be an implicit attempt 
by the Court to hold that discriminatory effects regulations exceed 
the authority of the federal government under Section 602 or the 
Fourteenth Amendment, but thought it unlikely "that the Court 
would overturn Guardians and Alexander in such an oblique 
manner."293 
284. See supra notes 117-133 and accompanying text. 
285. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 7()4.{)8. 
286. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925. 936 (3d Cir. 
1997). vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.). 1998 WL 477242 (1998). 
287.505 U.S. 717 (1992). 
288. Chester. 132 F.3d 925. at 931 n.9. vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.). 1998 WL 477242 (1998). 
289. 505 U.S. 717, 732 n.7 (1992). 
290. See Chester. 132 F.3d 925. at 931 n.9, vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.), 1998 WL 477242 
(1998). 
291. Chester, 132 F.3d 925. at 931 n.9. vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.). 1998 WL 477242 (1998). 
292. Chester. 132 F.3d 925, at 931 n.9, vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.). 1998 WL 477242 (1998). 
293. Chester, 132 F.3d 925. at 931 n.9. vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.), 1998 WL 477242 (1998). 
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VIII. SUPREME COURT GRANTS CERTIORARI, BUT THEN FINDS THE 
CAsE MOOT 
On June 8, 1998, the Supreme Court granted the PADEP's 
petition for a writ of certiorari to review the Third Circuit's 
determination that a plaintiff may bring a private right of action 
under Section 602.294 Additionally, the Court granted the 
Washington Legal Foundation's request to file an amicus brief95 
that maintained that the EPA's discriminatory effects regulations 
are invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment's intentional 
discrimination standard.296 
On July 29, 1998, CRCQL filed a motion to dismiss the case as 
moot because PDEQ on April 30, 1998, before the Supreme Court 
granted the petitioner's petition for a writ of certiorari, revoked 
the underlying permit in the case after it had expired and the 
permit applicant had indicated that it no longer planned to site a 
facility in Chester.297 Conversely, the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania filed a brief in opposition arguing that the case 
remain justiciable despite the revocation of the permit because the 
plaintiffs' complaint originally argued that PADEP's permit review 
process violated the EPA's Title VI regulations.298 Alternatively, 
294. See Seif v. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living, 132 F. 3d 925 (3d Cir. 
1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 2296 (U.S. June 8, 1998) (No. 97·1620), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 22, 
67 U.S.L.W. 3155 (U.S. Aug. 17, 1998) (No. 97·1620). 
295. Motion for Leave to File Brief and Brief Amicus Curiae of the Washington Legal 
Foundation in Suppon of Petitioners, Seif v. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality 
Living 118 S. Ct. 2296 (1998) [hereinafter Foundation Amicus Brief]. On August 6, 1998, 
the United States Chamber of Commerce and National Black Chamber of Commerce also 
filed an amicus brief arguing that Title VI is limited to intentional discrimination. Brief of 
Amicus Curiae of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, National Black 
Chamber of Commerce, Inc., and Pennsylvania Chamber of Business and Industry in 
Suppon of Petitioners, Seif v. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living, 118 S. Ct. 
2296 (1998), available in 1998 WL 457676 (U.S. Amicus Brief). 
296. See supra notes 287·290 and accompanying text [following PDEQ's argument that 
EPA's Section 602 disparate impact are invalid under United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 
(1992)]. 
297. See Suggestion of Mootness, Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living, Seif v. 
Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living 3-7 (U.S. 1998) (No. 97·1620). See also 
Megan Defendis, Pa. Unit Drops Lawsuit, Waste News, Aug. 10, 1998, at 1; Sturges, supra note 
23, atAA·l. 
298. See Opposition to Suggestion of Mootness, and, In the Alternative, Motion to Vacate, 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Seif v. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living 
(U.S. 1998) (No. 97·1620); See also Megan Defendis, Pa. Unit Drops Lawsuit, Waste News, Aug. 
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Pennsylvania argued that the Court should vacate the Third 
Circuit's decision to prevent the case from being cited as precedent 
in the future if the Court dismissed the case as moot.299 
On August 17, 1998, the Supreme Court granted both the 
CRCQL's petition to dismiss the case as moot and Pennsylvania's 
request to vacate the Third Circuit's decision.soo As a result, 
environmental justice plaintiffs may not rely on the decision as 
precedent in the Third Circuit or even cite it as a valid judgment in 
other circuits. 
The parties' predictions about how the Court would likely decide 
the case on the merits may have influenced their motions on the 
issues ofmootness and vacatur. CRCQL may have filed a motion to 
dismiss the case as moot because it was afraid it would lose before 
the high Court. Conversely, Pennsylvania may have opposed that 
motion because it thought it would win a reversal. Statistically, the 
Court reverses over fifty percent of the cases in which it grants 
certiorari.301 The fact that the Court granted certiorari in Chester 
might suggest that at least those four members of the Court 
necessary to grant a hearing disagreed with or were uncertain 
about the Third Circuit's decision. Yet some members of the Court 
who were inclined to agree with the Third Circuit might have 
believed that the Court should decide this issue. One may guess, 
but never know for certain how the Court would have decided the 
case had it not become moot. 
It is not surprising that the Court concluded the case was moot 
after Pennsylvania revoked the expired permit and the permit 
applicant indicated it would not build a facility in Chester. In the 
absence of a specific controversy, the Court was unlikely to address 
whether PADEP's permitting process is discriminatory. Similarly, 
the Court's decision to vacate the Third Circuit's decision was 
consistent with its treatment of cases in which an independent 
10, 1998, at 1; Peyton Sturges, Environmental Justice: High Courl Dismisses Challenge, Vacates 
Third Circuit Civil &ghts Decision, 160 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) AA-l (Aug. 19, 1998). 
299. See Opposition to Suggestion of Mootness, and, In the Alternative, Motion to Vacate, 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Seif v. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living 
(U.S. 1998) (No. 97-1620}. 
300. Seif v. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living, 119 S.Ct. 22, 67 U.S.L.W. 
3155 (U.S. Aug. 17, 1998) (No. 97-1620}. 
301. U.S. Bancorp Mongage Co. v. Bonner Mall Pannership, 513 U.S. 18,28-29 (1994); 
Jill E. Fisch, Rewriting History: T~ Propriety of Eradicating Prior Decisional Law Through Settlement 
and Vacatur, 76 CoRNELLL. REv. 589, 595 n.25 (1991) (citing studies). 
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event (i.e., the revocation of the permit) makes a case moot.302 It is 
only where parties voluntarily make a case moot (e.g., by 
negotiating a settlement) that the Court allows the judgment in a 
mooted case to remain valid.303 
IX. SANDOVAL V. HAGAN 
On June 3, 1998, just before the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in Chester, in Sandoval v. Hagan,3M the District Court for 
the Middle District of Alabama agreed with the Third Circuit 
regarding the existence of a private right of action under Section 
602.305 The District Court applied the same three-factor test as the 
Third Circuit. Under the first prong, it concluded that Alexander 
clearly stated that agencies have authority under Section 602 to 
issue disparate impact regulations.-
Under the second prong, the court concurred with the Third 
Circuit that the legislative history of the 1987 Act was sufficient 
evidence of a congressional intent to create an implied right of 
action under Section 602.307 Additionally, the court agreed with the 
Third Circuit that a private right of action would not interfere with 
the EPA's administrative scheme because a suit does not interfere 
with the notice provisions in the EPA's regulations and a plaintiff 
could not compel a funding termination decision.308 
Finally, under the third prong, the court agreed that a private 
right of action would advance the statute's dual purposes of 
preventing discrimination by fund recipients and protecting 
individuals from such discrimination.309 A private right would 
advance those purposes by deputizing private attorneys general to 
enforce Section 602 and its implementing regulations, as well as 
addressing the United States' admission that it lacks the resources 
302. u.s. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18,22-29 (1994) 
(Supreme Court normally vacates moot cases, but not if petitioner voluntarily makes case 
moot through settlement); United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950) 
(Supreme Court normally vacates moot cases). 
303. U.S. Bancmp Murtgage Co., 513 U.S. at 22-29 (Supreme Court normally vacates moot 
cases, but not if petitioner voluntarily makes case moot through settlement). 
304. 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (M.D. Ala. 1998). 
305. [d. at 1256. 
306. [d. at 1257. 
307. [d. at 1258-59. 
308. [d. at 125~. 
309. [d. at 1261. 
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necessary to achieve adequate enforcement.slo Accordingly, the 
court held that plaintiffs may sue to enforce regulations under 
Section 602.311 
In addition, the court observed that "Title VI relationships are, 
essentially, contractual in nature."312 Hence, the plaintiffs could 
bring a private right of action as third-party beneficiaries of 
contracts between the federal government and the recipient, the 
Alabama Department of Public Safety.313 
On the merits, the court held that the Alabama Department of 
Public Safety had violated Title VI by promulgating a regulation 
that required all driver's license examinations to be administered 
. E l' h 314 III ngls . 
While the Third Circuit's decision is no longer good law, other 
courts may still infer a private right of action under Section 602 by 
citing Sandoval as precedent. Additionally, Sandoval's third-party 
beneficiary contract theory provides yet another ground for private 
suits.315 Because it is only a decision by a single district court judge, 
Sandoval will probably not have the same positive influence for 
environmental justice advocates as the Third Circuit's decision 
would have had. Nonetheless, Sandoval suggests that plaintiffs will 
continue to raise challenges based on a private right of action 
under Section 602. 
X. CONSISTENCY WITH SECTION 601 ARGUES FOR INFERRING A 
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT TO CREATE AN IMPLIED RIGHT OF ACTION 
UNDER SECTION 602 OF TITLE VI 
Because Sections 601 and 602 are interrelated and serve the 
same statutory purposes, this article proposes that it would be 
310. Id. at 1261. 
311. Id. at 1262. 
312. Id. at 1262. 
313. Id. at 1262-64. 
314. Id. at 1277-1316. 
315. See generally Block, Enfurcemmt of Title W Compliance Agreements by Third Party 
BenefICiaries, 18 Harv. C.R - C.L.L. Rev. 1, 31-51 (1983) (arguing a Title VI plaintiff may 
bring a private right of action as third-party beneficiary of contract between federal 
government and federal funding recipient); Roben Adelson, Note, Third Party Beneficiary 
and Implied Right of Action Analysis: The Fiction of One Government Intent, 94 YALE LJ. 875 
(1985) (arguing case law improperly confuses congressional intent in statute with intent of 
federal funding agency in contract and that Title VI plaintiff should be able to file a private 
right of action as third-party benefiCiary of contract between federal government and federal 
funding recipient even if statute itself would not allow such a suit). 
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inconsistent to apply today's more stringent standard for inferring 
congressional intent in deciding whether a private right exists 
under Section 602 in light of the Supreme Court's application of a 
more lenient standard in recognizing a right under section 601. 
Although by the time the Supreme Court decided Guardians it had 
begun to apply a more restrictive approach emphasizing legislative 
intent (as suggested by Justice Powell's Cannon dissent) seven 
members of the Guardians Court agreed that private parties have 
an implied right of action under section 601 of Title VI. They 
reasoned that Cannon had settled the issue in inferring a private 
right of action under Title IX, which contains language identical to 
Title VI.316 Similarly, it would be inconsistent to apply today's more 
stringent standard for inferring congressional intent in deciding 
whether a private right exists under Section 602 when the Supreme 
Court has applied a more lenient standard in recognizing a private 
right under Section 60l. 
Under a test emphasizing legislative purpose, there is a much 
stronger case for implying a private right of action under Section 
602 and its implementing regulations than if courts were to focus 
on whether there is specific evidence that Congress intended to 
establish private suits under Title VI. Neither Title IX nor Title VI 
include a specific provision authorizing plaintiffs to sue recipients 
of federal financial assistance, but in Cannon the majority 
emphasized Title IX and Title VI's dual purposes of preventing 
recipient discrimination and of protecting individual rights, rather 
than the explicit evidence of congressional intent in inferring that 
a private right of action exists under both statutes.m 
Courts should acknowledge that the evidence of legislative intent 
to create a private right of action is relatively weak, but should still 
conclude that it is proper to infer such a remedy. Both Sections 
601 and 602 serve the same dual purposes of combating 
316. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Sernce Comm'n of N.Y., 463 u.s. 582, 594-95; id. at 612-
15 (O'Connor, j.); id. at 635 (Stevens, j., joined by Brennan & Blackmun, lJ.); id. at 615 
(Marshall,j.) but see id. at 608-10 (Powell,]., & Burger, CJ.) (arguing Cannon was incorrectly 
decided and that there should be no implied rights of action under either Titles VI or IX). 
In Guardians, Justices Powell and Burger's dissent argued that private parties should not 
have an implied right of action under section 601 of Title VI because Cannon was incorrectly 
decided and there should not be such a private right under Title IX either. See id. at 608-10 
(Powell,j., & Burger, CJ.) (arguing Cannon was incorrectly decided and that there should 
be no implied rights of action under either Titles VI or IX). 
317. See Cannon, 441 U.S. 677 at 704-07 (1979); supra and infra notes 158-189 and 
accompanying text. 
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discrimination by fund recipients and of protecting individual 
rights.sl8 If serving these dual purposes was sufficient in Cannon 
and Guardians to infer that Congress intended to create a private 
right of action under Titles IX and VI, it should be sufficient to 
infer the same intent under Section 602 of Title VI. 
While deputizing private attorneys general under Section 602 
would help combat recipient discrimination,319 there is an even 
stronger argument that recognizing a private right of action under 
Section 602 is essential to protect individuals from discriminatory 
recipient behavior because the EPA's Title VI regulations contain 
the two mcyor limitations that the Cannon Court used to justify 
creating an implied right of action: (1) a complainant may not 
directly participate in the administrative process; and (2) a 
complainant is eligible only for the indirect remedy of tenninated 
funding to the recipient.320 
Allowing a private right of action under Title VI's implementing 
regulations would advance Title VI's interest in protecting 
individual rights without interfering with its interest in tenninating 
federal funding to discriminatory recipients. A private party may 
not request that a court tenninate funding to a discriminatory 
recipient.321 Accordingly, the funding agency retains full control 
over when to tenninate funding to a discriminatory recipient. s22 
Additionally, if relief for unintentional discrimination is limited to 
declaratory or injunctive relief, a private suit would in no way 
"dissuade potential non discriminating recipients from 
participating in federal programs, thereby hindering the objectives 
of the funding statutes."S2S Hence, in light of the limited relief 
available to plaintiffs under Guardians, there is no real concern for 
a conflict between administrative enforcement of Title VI's 
implementing regulations and a private right of action under those 
same regulations. 
318. ld. 
319. See supra notes 282-286 and accompanying text. 
320. See 40 C.F.R § 7; Cannon, 441 U.S. 667, at 707 n.41; Colopy, supra note 11, at 157 n. 
142, 178-80; supra notes 172-180, 282-286 and accompanying text. 
321. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 935-36 (3d 
Cir. 1997), vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.), 1998 WL 477242 (1998); see generally Guardians, 463 
U.S. 582, at 598-603. 
322. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 935-36 (3d 
Cir. 1997), vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.), 1998 WL 477242 (1998); see generally Guardians, 463 
U.S. 582, at 601; supra notes 119, 128-129, 133,284 and accompanying text. 
323. Guardians, 463 U.S. 582, at 601~2. 
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The EPA has strongly argued that its Title VI regulations: (1) do 
not preclude a private right of action; (2) will not interfere with the 
agency's enforcement program; and (3) that this remedy will, in 
fact, advance the statute's purposes in light of the agency's limited 
'24 resources. 
In both Borak and Cannon, the Supreme Court gave considerable 
weight to whether the relevant agency believed that private 
remedies would interfere with its administrative enforcement 
scheme.'25 The EPA's regulations establish administrative 
procedures that individuals "may" invoke.'26 The EPA interprets 
the use of the word "may" in its Title VI regulations as indicating 
that the administrative process is not the sole means to enforce its 
regulations and, accordingly, that its regulations do not preclude 
private enforcement of its discriminatory effects regulations.'27 
Courts normally respect an agency's interpretation of its own 
regulations unless its interpretation is "plainly erroneous" or 
"inconsistent" with the regulation.328 The EPA's interpretation that 
private suits are consistent with its Section 602 regulations is 
plausible because these suits would not interfere with agency 
investigations or fund termination decisions. Furthermore, the 
agency has stated that it lacks the resources to pursue all Title VI 
complaints and, therefore, that private rights of action are needed 
to vindicate many individual Title VI violations that are not 
pervasive enough to justify termination of the EPA's funding to the 
recipient.329 Accordingly, an implied right of action under Title VI 
regulations will serve the statute's purpose of protecting individual 
rights without interfering with the EPA's administrative process. 
Although most courts do not require exhaustion of 
administrative remedies before initiating a private right of action,330 
324. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif. 132 F.3d 925. 935-36 (3d 
Cir. 1997). vacated, No. 97-1620 (U.S.). 1998 WL 477242 (1998); EPA Amicus Brief. supra 
note 79. at 12-13; Michael B. Gerrard & MonicaJahan Bose. The Emerging Area of "justice.' 
218 N.Y.LJ .• July 25. 1997. at 3. 
325. See Cannon. 441 U.S. 667. at 70()'()7; supra notes 153. 164 and accompanying text. 
326. See 40 C.F.R § 7.120(a); EPA Amicus Brief. supra note 79. at 12. 
327. See EPA Amicus Brief. supra note 79. at 12-13 nA. 
328. SeeAuer v. Robbins. 117 S. Ct. 905. 911-12 (1997). 
329. See Polaroid, 862 F.2d 987, at 997; EPA Amicus Brief. supra note 79. at 11-14. 
330. See Cannon. 441 U.S. 667. 708 nAI ("[W]e are not persuaded that individual suits are 
inappropriate in advance of exhaustion of administrative remedies."); Neighborhood Action 
Coalition v. City of Canton. 882 F.2d 1012. 1015 (6th Cir. 1989) ("[Courts] squarely hold 
that litigants need not exhaust their administrative remedies prior to bringing a Tide VI 
claim in federal court."); Chowdbury v. Reading Hosp. & Medical Ctr .• 677 F.3d 317. 322-23 
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there is more disagreement about whether plaintiffs can entirely 
by-pass the administrative process or must at least file an 
administrative complaint.331 Even if a plaintiff is first required to 
file an administrative complaint, the limitations of the 
administrative process (in terms of both remedies and 
participation) argue in favor of allowing private parties to file suit 
to enforce an agency's disparate impact regulations under Section 
602 of Title VI. 
In addition, private suits are the only means to redress individual 
harms when recipients retaliate against "whistle blower" employees. 
The EPA's Title VI regulations prohibit retaliation by a recipient 
against an individual who files a complaint, but that prohibition 
does not appear in the statute's text.332 If a victim of retaliation 
cannot file a suit and must pursue the administrative process, there 
is no guarantee that a voluntary compliance agreement between 
the funding agency and recipient must address or remedy that 
harm.333 Because the administrative process does not provide 
adequate protections against retaliation by a recipient against a 
complainant, several courts have allowed private individuals to file 
suit in federal court to enforce anti-retaliation provisions in agency 
Title VI or Title IX regulations.334 At least in the case of retaliation, 
(3d Cir. 1982) (exhaustion of agency funding termination procedures not a necessary 
prerequisite to private action for injunctive relieO; Colopy, supra note 11, at 158 n.I44; but 
see Wrenn v. Kansas, 561 F. Supp. 1216, 1222 (D. Kan. 1983) (requiring Tide VI plaintiffs to 
exhaust administrative remedies before seeking redress in federal court). 
331. See Cole, supra note 110, at 322-23; Colopy, supra note 11, at 158 n.I44; Compare 
Pushkin v. Regents ofUniv. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 138().82 (lOth Cir. 1981) (plaintiffs can 
sue in federal court without pursuing administrative remedies) and Camenisch v. University 
of Tex., 616 F.2d 127, 135 (5th Cir. 1980) (same) with Scelsa v. City Univ. of N.Y., 806 F. 
Supp. 1126, 1138-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (While plaintiffs need not delay suit until 
administrative remedies are completely exhausted, they must initiate a federal agency's Tide 
VI administrative procedures before commencing a lawsuit against the recipient, unless 
seeking relief would be futile). 
332. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.100; EPA Amicus Brief, supra note 79, at 14 n.5. 
333. See Cannon, 441 U.S. 677, 707 n.41; Chowdhury v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 677 
F.2d 317, 322 n.13, 323 n.16 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229 (1983); EPA Amicus 
Brief, supra note 79, at 14 n.5. 
334. See, e.g., Lowrey v. Texas A & M Univ. Syst., 117 F.3d 242, 247-54 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(plaintiff stated private cause of action for retaliation in violation of Tide IX); Preston v. 
Virginia, 31 F.3d 203, 206 n.2 (4th Cir. 1994) (allowing retaliation claim under Tide IX, but 
affirming district court decision that plaintiff had failed to prove retaliation); Topol v. 
Trustees of Univ. of Pa., 160 F.R.D. 474, 475 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (permitting plaintiff to amend 
complaint to add retaliation claim under Tide IX); Clay v. Board of Trustees of Neosho 
Community College, 905 F.Supp. 1488, 1493-95 (D. Kan. 1995) (allowing retaliation claim 
under Tide IX); Davis v. Halpern, 768 F. Supp. 968, 984-87 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (denying 
summary judgment against plaintiffs retaliation claims under Tide VI); but see Holt v. Lewis, 
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courts ought to authorize private rights of action based upon Title 
VI regulations. However, if retaliation suits based on the EPA's 
Title VI regulations are appropriate, then courts should allow a 
private right of action pursuant to Section 602 for all plaintiffs 
based on the existence of the same problem that complainants do 
not have a right to participate in the administrative process or to 
obtain a remedy for individual harms caused them by the 
•• 335 
reCIpIent. 
Theoretically, there is the possibility that Congress intended only 
to establish private rights of action to remedy acts of intentional 
discrimination under Section 601, but not actions that have 
unintended and unjustified disparate impacts in violation of agency 
regulations under Section 602. There is no real evidence that 
Congress intended to limit private rights of action in Title VI to 
acts of intentional discrimination under Section 601. The costs to 
minorities in not considering disproportionate impact far outweigh 
the risks involved in explicitly considering race.336 Under the 
standards of Cannon and Guardians for inferring congressional 
intent, the fact that a private right of action will protect Title VI's 
dual purposes of combating discrimination by fund recipients and 
protecting individual rights should be enough to imply that 
Congress intended to infer a private right of action under Title VI's 
Section 602 implementing regulations.337 
XI. CONCLUSION 
The question of whether there is an implied private right of 
action under Section 602's implementing regulations would be 
much easier and less important if Guardians had not established 
the high standard of proof of intentional discrimination under 
Section 601 of Title VI, and an disparate impact standard under 
Section 602. Because Guardians's requirement that a plaintiff, 
under Section 601, must introduce evidence of intentional 
discrimination was clearly influenced by the Court's decisions 
955 F. Supp. 1385,1388-89 (N.D. Ala. 1995) (holding Title IX does not provide for a private 
cause of action for retaliation claims because there is no express language in statute creating 
such a remedy and expressly rejecting analysis in Preston). 
335. See supra notes 125, 130 and accompanying text. 
336. See generally Lawrence, supra note 39, at 320 n.12.; see also Colopy, supra note 11, at 
146. 
337. See Cannon, 441 U.S. 677, 704-07; supra notes 172-180, 282-286, 318-324 and 
accompanying text. 
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applying that standard of proof under the Equal Protection 
Clause,338 the Court will likely continue to require proof of intent 
under Section 601 as long as it continues to do so under the Equal 
Protection Clause. There are strong arguments that the Court's 
intent standard under the Equal Protection Clause makes it too 
difficult for plaintiffs to prove that government has engaged in 
discriminatory actions. However, the Court is unlikely to modify 
that restrictive standard of proof in the near future. ss9 The next 
best solution is to allow an implied private right of action for 
discriminatory effects discrimination under Title VI's Section 602 
implementing regulations. 
In Chester, the Third Circuit cited Cart, but did not discuss more 
recent cases that have applied Cart more restrictively. Chester was 
also problematic because it relied on weak evidence in the 1987 
Civil Rights Restoration Act to find that Congress intended to 
establish a private right of action under Section 602 of Title VI. 
Perhaps this failure to cite more recent cases was an implicit 
acknowledgment by the Third Circuit that its conclusion that the 
1987 Act provided sufficient evidence to infer a private cau~e of 
action would not stand up under those cases.340 Additionally, 
because the 1987 Civil Rights Restoration Act was not directly 
concerned with the issue of private rights of action under either 
Section 601 or 602 of Title VI, the various comments made 
regarding private rights of action under Title VI by members of 
Congress, witnesses, or executive office staff cannot carry much 
weight. 
However, to treat Sections 601 and 602 consistently, it would be 
incompatible to apply today's more stringent standard for inferring 
congressional intent in deciding whether a private right exists 
under Section 602 in light of the Supreme Court's application of a 
more lenient standard in recognizing a right under Section 601. A 
private right of action under section 602 and its implementing 
regulations would serve Title VI's dual purposes of combating 
discrimination by fund recipients and of protecting individual 
rights.341 A lawsuit seeking prospective relief under Section 602 
could protect both purposes without interfering with any 
338. See supra notes 37-42, 65-66, 76 and accompanying text. 
339. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text; if. supra notes 287-293. 
340. See supra notes 255-270 and accompanying text. 
341. See Cannon, 441 U.S. 677, 70407; supra notes 172-180, 282-286, 318-324, 337 and 
accompanying text. 
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important aspects of the administrative process for investigating 
complaints or penalizing a discriminating recipient.542 
Furthermore, an implied right of action under the regulations is 
the only effective means to achieve Title VI's second interest in 
protecting individual rights. The administrative process does not 
guarantee individual participation nor does its remedies protect 
individual rights.543 Additionally, a private right of action under 
Section 602 and its implementing regulations is the only means to 
address the individual harms caused when a funding recipient 
engages in retaliatory behavior.544 
The Supreme Court recognized the importance of the existence 
of a private right of action under Section· 602 when it granted 
certiorari in Chester. However, the Court followed its normal 
practice in vacating a case that had become moot for reasons 
beyond the control of the petitioner, PADEP, because the 
applicant no longer wished to pursue building a waste facility in 
Chester Township.545 As a result, environmental justice advocates 
have lost the Third Circuit's decision as precedent. However, they 
may still rely on its reasoning, and cite Sandoval Additionally, 
Sandoval provides a third party beneficiary contract rationale for 
implying a private right of action under section 602 and its 
implementing regulations.546 
It is likely that environmental justice plaintiffs will continue to 
file claims based on a private right of action under Section 602.547 
Ultimately, courts will have to address this issue. Because they have 
342. See supra notes 271-281, 321-331 and accompanying text 
343. See Cannon, 441 U.S. 677, 704-07; supra notes 176-180, 284-286, 320, 335 and 
accompanying text. 
344. See supra notes 332-335 and accompanying text. 
345. See supra notes 320-337 and accompanying text. 
346. See supra notes 312-313 and accompanying text. 
347. See Powell v. Ridge, 1998 WL 726653 § 11 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (Slip Copy) (citing Chesterfor 
proposition that Section 602 of Title VI creates private right of action without mentioning 
Supreme Court's vacatur of decision); Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 1998 WL § 
1726653 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (denying defendant's motion to amend order to certifY question for 
immediate appeal because Supreme Court's granting of certiorari in Chester did not raise 
substantial doubts about numerous circuit decisions recognizing private rights of action 
because one can only speculate about how Court would have decided case if it had not vacated 
the Third Circuit's judgment); The South Bronx Coalition for Clean Air, Inc. v. Conroy, 20 
F.Supp.2d 565, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (obselVing that it is uncertain whether private right of 
action exists under section 602 after Supreme Court vacated Chester and dismissing claim 
because plaintiffs allegations are insufficient to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact 
discrimination under Title VI); Sturges, supra note 23, at AA-I. 
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already recognized a private cause of action under Section 601, 
courts ought to imply the same right under Section 602 because 
that provision selVes the same dual goals of preventing recipient 
discrimination and of protecting individual rights. By allowing 
proof based on unjustified disparate impacts, an implied private 
right of action under Section 602 and its implementing regulations 
will make it much easier for environmental justice plaintiffs to 
challenge state permit decisions. 

